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INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION

In October
October 2008, Congress passed
passed the Emergency
Economic
Emergency Economic
In
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)
(EESA) that created
created the Troubled
Troubled Asset Relief
Relief
Stabilization
Program (TARP)
(TARP) and appropriated
appropriated $700 billion to "restore
"restore liquidity and
Program
....."',,1 Pursuant to TARP, the U.S.
U.S.
stability to the financial system
system...
stability
undertaken
Government's
extraordinary
investment
in
private
business
was
undertaken
Government's extraordinary investment
federal assistance
crisis?2 The amount
amount of federal
assistance to
to combat the financial crisis.
financial institutions
institutions and the automotive industry
industry was staggering. As of
of
financial
March 31,
2010, the U.S.
U.S. Department
Treasury (Treasury)
(Treasury) had
Department of the Treasury
31, 2010,
March
expenditures of approximately
approximately $497 billion, of which
planned TARP expenditures
approximately $382 billion
billion had
had been
been disbursed. 3 Financial
Financial institutions
institutions
approximately
accounted for the largest
largest amount of funds, primarily in the form of direct
direct
financial institution
institution support
support programs
programs ($320.7
($320.7
investment
investment of capital through financial
categorized as asset support
billion) as well as another $51 billion categorized
programs, the purpose of which was to support the liquidity and market
market
programs,

* Charles

Hartsock Professor
Professor of
of Law
and Director,
Director, Corporate
Corporate Law
Law Center,
• Charles Hartsock
Law and
Cincinnati College of Law. Thanks to the editors of the
University of Cincinnati
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal
Journalfor inviting me to participate in the March
Entrepreneurial
andAmerican
Relationship Between American Government and
2010 Symposium, The Relationship
Business. John Wolfenden, University of Cincinnati College of Law, expected
Business.
of
2012, and Aaron Bernay, Rosina Caponi and Jerrod Kuhn (all University of
Cincinnati College of Law, expected 2010) provided excellent
excellent research
research assistance.
This article reflects events as of July 1,
1, 2010.
I'Emergency
Emergency Economic
U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West
of 2008 §§ 2(1), 12 U.S.c.A.
Stabilization Act of2008
Economic Stabilization
2008).
2 While government
government bailouts are not new, earlier forms of assistance generally took
Block,
the form ofloans,
insurance or other subsidies. See Cheryl D. Block.
of loans, guaranties, insurance
Bailout Policy,
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951,
951,
Public Bailout
Developingaa Public
Bailouts: Developing
and Covert
Covert Bailouts:
Overt and
1031-34 (1992)
(1992) (describing past government
government bailouts). In the savings and loan
of
crisis of the 1980s,
1980s, the FDIC took preferred shares or warrants in a number of
Corp. in the
failed banks; the U.S.
U.S. government received warrants in Chrysler Corp.
automaker's previous bailout. Id.
Id.
FOR THE
THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
33OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY
REpORT
TO
CONGRESS,
33
[hereinafter
33 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT
2010].
Apr. 2010].
SIGTARP,
REPORT TO CONGRESS Apr.
QUARTERLY REpORT
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY
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value of
of assets
assets owned
owned by
by financial
financial institutions.
institutions.44 Support
Support to the
the automotive
automotive
value
55
industry
accounted
$84.8
billion.
for
$84.8
accounted
industry
Through the
the TARP
TARP program,
program, the government
government became
became aa substantial
substantial
Through
in five major
major U.S.
U.S. companies.
companies. Two
Two of
of them-American
them-American
equity holder
holder in
equity
International Group,
Group, Inc. (AIG),
(AIG), an
an international
international insurance
insurance organization,
organization,fj
International
Citigroup Inc.
Inc. (Citigroup),
(Citigroup), a global
global diversified
diversified financial
financial services
services
and. Citigroup
company7-are publicly
publicly traded
traded corporations;
corporations; three
three are
are currently
currently
holding company'-are
owned-General Motors
Motors Company
Company (GM),
(GM), one of the world's
world's
privately owned-General
privately
largest automakers
automakers that
that traces
traces its roots back
back to 1908,8
1908,8 Chrysler
Chrysler Group
Group LLC
largest
9 and GMAC
(Chrysler), for years
years America's
America's third
third largest automaker,
automaker,9
GMAC Inc.
Inc.
(Chrysler),
in
founded
was
as
Ally
Financial
Inc.
(Ally),
which
founded
in
(GMAC),
now
known
which
(Ally),
Ally Financial Inc.
known
(GMAC),
1919 to provide financing to purchasers
purchasers of automobiles.'o
automobiles. \0
1919
By mid-2010, the government's
government's investment
investment in
in business is winding
winding
By
recipients
down.
I
I
Many
of
the
banks
and
financial
services
recipients
that
were
firms
of
down."
of TARP
TARP funds have
have returned to profitability
profitability and
and have
have repaid
repaid their
their loans
loans
of
ahead of schedule.1
schedule. 122 Treasury
Treasury began
began divestiture
divestiture of
of its Citigroup
Citigroup shares
shares
announced a TARP
TARP
through sales
sales in the market. 1313 In June 2010, Treasury announced
through
TARP.
"milestone":
exceeded the amount of TARP
"milestone": repayments ($194 billion) exceeded
funds outstanding ($190
($190 billion).14
Treasury had
announced that Treasury
billion). 14 It also announced
dividends and other income
received approximately
approximately $23 billion in interest, dividends
and that the overall projected cost of the TARP program was estimated
estimated at

44Id.
Id. at

35 fig.2.2.
at35

5sId.

id.
6

AM. INT'L
INT'L GRP.,
GRP., INC.,
INC.,
6 AM.

2009 ANNuAL
ANNUAL REpORT
REPORT (2010), available
availablea.t
at
2009
http://www.aigcorporate.comlinvestors/20
10_Apri1J2009AnnuaIReport.pdf.
http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/2010_April/2009AnnualReport.pdf.
7
available at
REPORT 2009, at 4 (2010), available
7 CmGROUP,
CITIGROUP, Cm
CITI ANNuAL
ANNUAL REpORT
http://www.citigroup.comlcitilfinidatalar09c_en.pdf
.
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar09cen.pdf
MOTORS, http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/
8 About GM, GENERAL MOTORS,
http://www.gm.comlcorporate/aboutl (last visited
July 21,2010).
21, 2010).
99 Chrysler
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
ChryslerLLC, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.comltop/news/
10, 2010).
Aug. 10,2010).
business/companies/chrysler_llc/index.html
business/companies/chryslerllc/index.html (last updated Aug.
10
http://www.ally.com/about/companyFINANCIAL, http://www.ally.comlaboutlcompanyHistory,ALLY FINANCIAL,
OurHistory,
1o Our
12, 2010).
structurelhistory/index.html
(last visited Sept. 12,2010).
structure/history/index.html (last
II
and
under EESA and.·
his power under
Treasury Secretary
Secretary exercised his
In December
December 2009, the Treasury
" In
extended TARP through October 3,
shifted to home
2010. TARP's focus shifted
3, 2010.
foreclosures and small-business
small-business and
and community lending
lending initiatives. SIGTARP,
SIGTARP,
QUARTERLY REpORT
supranote 3, at 33.
Apr. 2010,
2010, supra
CONGRESS Apr.
TO CONGRESS
REPORT TO
2
12/d.
Id. at
at 5.
5.
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces the
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofthe Treasury, Treasury Announces the Completion
1, 2010),
Stock (July 1,
of its Current
Plan to Sell Citigroup Common Stock
Trading Plan
Current Trading
available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg764.htm.
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg764.htm.
availableat
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
the Treasury,
Treasury, Treasury
Treasury Dep't
Dep't Announces
Announces TARP
TARP
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
11,
(June 11,
Funds Outstanding (June
Milestone: Repayments to Taxpayers
ARP Funds
Surpass TTARP
Taxpayers Surpass
2010),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg742.htm.
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg742.htm.
availableat
2010), available
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$105.4 billion,
billion, an amount
amount less than
than the
the original
original forecast."
forecast. 15 Although
Although it is
is
$105.4
unlikely
that
the
government
will
be
able
to
extricate
itself
from
AIG
in
the
extricate itself
able
government will
unlikely that
future,166 and
and the
the government
government has
has put forth
forth no solutions"
solutions l7 for the
near future,'
intractable problems of the government-sponsored
government-sponsored enterprises
enterprises Fannie
Fannie Mae
intractable
2008,18
Freddie Mac
Mac that were placed
placed in conservatorships
conservatorships in September
September 2008,8
and Freddie
federal bailouts
bailouts appears to be drawing
drawing to an end-for
end-for now.
the era of federal
Indeed, government,
government, the American
American taxpayer,
taxpayer, and business
business alike
alike all
all
fervently wish for an end to government
government bailouts,
bailouts, for the alliance of
of
Treasury consistently
government and business
business has been an uneasy
uneasy one. Treasury
consistently
government
described itself
itself as aa "reluctant
"reluctant shareholder,,19
express its discomfort
discomfort with
shareholder" 9 to express
described
the role, and
and Main
Main Street resented
resented the money
money and the attention paid to Wall
20
Up.20
TARP
foreclosures and unemployment
unemployment rates went
went up.
TARP
Street while home foreclosures
recipients complained
complained about having to account to a variety
variety of federal
recipients
2
demands;21
businesses that did
did
bureaucrats with competing
competing and conflicting
conflicting demands;
' businesses
bureaucrats
disadvantages from competing
competing
assistance complained
complained of disadvantages
not receive federal assistance
with government-assisted
government-assisted businesses?2
businesses.2 2
bailouts present many troubling issues that will be analyzed and
and
The bailouts
congressional committees and panels
debated for years to come. To date, congressional
23
have held over one
one hundred hearings
hearingS23 on the federal bailout, Congress has
TARP
set up the Congressional
Congressional Oversight Panel to oversee
oversee the T
ARP program 24
15Id.
16 In its Annual
Annual Report
Report on
Form 10-K
for the
the year
year ending
2009, AIG states
16 In its
on Form
10-K for
ending Dec. 31,
31,2009,
assistance, without
that should certain risks occur it may require additional federal assistance,
which there is substantial
substantial doubt about its continued existence as a going concern.
Am. Int'l
In1'l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Feb. 26, 2010).
1 Sewell
UnderPressure,
17
Sewell Chan, Under
Pressure, the White House
House Ponders
Ponders How to Remake Fannie
Fannie
and Freddie,
Freddie, N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at B3.
B3.
18 Press Release, U.S.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement
Statement by Secretary
Secretary Henry M.
Federal Housing Finance
Finance Agency Action to Protect
Protect
Treasury and Federal
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7,
7, 2008),
2008), available
at
availableat
Financial
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpll29.htm.
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpI129.htm.
19
'9 See,
See, e.g., OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY
FINANCIAL REpORT,
REPORT
[hereinafter OFS FINANCIAL REpORT
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 42 [hereinafter
FINANCIAL
2009].
20
20 This was reflected, for example, in the public's anger toward bonuses paid to
AIG Swells As Bonuses Go
at AIG
AIG executives. Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at
Al.
Out,
17, 2009, at AI.
Out, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,2009,
21
Monica Langley
Langley &
CitigroupChafes
Chafes Under
Under U.S.
& David Enrich, Citigroup
21 See, e,g.,
eg., Monica
Overseers,
Al.
J., Feb. 25, 2009, at AI.
Overseers, WALL ST. 1.,
22
22 See, e.g., Colin Barr, Former
UnderAttack,
Attack, CNNMONEY,
CNNMoNEY, June 3,
3,
FormerGMAC
GMAC Bank Under
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/03/news/ally.enemy.fortune/index.htm.
2009, http://money.cnn.coml2009/06/03/news/ally.enemy.fortune/index.htm.
23
Kemen, University
University of Cincinnati Law Library, for
23 I am grateful to Shannon Kernen,
compiling
from government sources. Information on file with author.
compiling a list from
24
24 About Us,
(last
http://cop.senate.gov/about/ (last
Us, CONGRESSIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, http://cop.senate.gov/about!
visited Oct. 10,
10, 2010).

u.s.
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Financial Crisis Inquiry
Inquiry Commission
Commission to examine
examine the causes
causes of
of the
and the Financial
25s
Office
financial
crisis/
and
both
the
U.S.
Government
Accountability
Office
Accountability
U.S. Government
financial crisis, and both
26
(GAO)26
and the TARP
TARP Special
Special Inspector
Inspector General
General (SIGTARP)
(SIGTARPi277 are
(GAO)
and
TARP and issuing reports
responsible for monitoring
monitoring the
the administration
administration of TARP
responsible
important
periodically to Congress.
Congress. The lessons we learn can have important
periodically
implications for future government
government action. Notwithstanding
Notwithstanding the assertions
assertions
implications
28
bailouts and
and "too
"too big to fail"
fail" are over,
over,28
passage of the
the passage
that federal bailouts
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
Reform and Consumer
Consumer Protection
Protection Act (the DoddDodd-Frank
Acti299 contains
contains little that will prevent
prevent firms from being
being "too
"too big to
Frank Act)
Frank
fail" in the
the future. Businesses
Businesses will continue
continue to take
take risks
risks to maximize
fail"
they will operate with
with an assumption
assumption that, in the
profits, and it is likely that they
systemic risk, the government
government will again
again bail them out.
face of systemic
government has not
Despite the likelihood of future bailouts, the government
articulated a consistent policy
policy to deal with private
private enterprise
enterprise failure, and
articulated
government should act as a shareholder.
shareholder.
there is no rule book for how the government
This is not surprising;
surprising; the philosophy
philosophy of free market capitalism,
capitalism, so deeply
deeply
engrained in the U.S. economic
economic system, is difficult
difficult to reconcile
reconcile with the
30
businesses that fail in that
that system.
Unlike some
government's
Unlike
system. 3D
government's rescue of businesses
U.S. government
government does not invest surplus funds or
other countries, the U.S.
engage in entrepreneurial
activities for economic
economic gain.33'! The phrase
entrepreneurial activities
"nationalizing
business" conveys serious
serious negative connotations.
connotations.
"nationalizing private business"
significant
Accordingly, how the government
government behaves when it is a significant
shareholder
question worthy of examination. Part II
shareholder in private business is a question
of this Article sets forth, as background, general principles
principles of corporate
25 FINANCIAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION,
www.fcic.gov (last visited Sept. 21,
CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, www.fcic.gov
21,

25

2010).
26 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, www.gao.gov
26 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
www.gao.gov (last visited Sept. 21,
21,
2010).
27 See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
FOR THE
THE TROUBLED
PROGRAM,
27 See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN.
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
www.sigtarp.gov
(last
visited
Sept.
21,
2010).
www.sigtarp.gov
28
See SENATE COMM. ON
ON BANKING,
BANKING, Hous.,
AND URBAN
28 See SENATE COMM.
HOus., AND
URBAN AFFAIRS,
TH CONG.,
CONG.,
AFFAIRS, 111
I11TH
CONSUMER
BRIEF SUMMARY
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK
PROTECTION
PROTECTION ACT (2010).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
29 Dodd-Frank
Pub. L. No. 111-203,
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 2010) (to be codified in scattered
U.S. C.).
sections and titles of U.S.C.).
30 Block, supra
supra note 2, at 990-93 (asserting a free-market
free-market presumption against
public bailouts); Press Release, U.S.
Statement by the
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement
at
availableat
Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS and the Federal Reserve, (Feb. 23, 2009), available
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg38.htm
(stating that "our economy functions
http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/tg38.htm (stating
in the private sector").
better when financial institutions are well
well managed in
3 Others have explored
explored the conflicting philosophies of government and
and business.
3!
See,
Sch. of
of
Jefferson Sch.
State Entrepreneurism
Entrepreneurism(Thomas Jefferson
See, e.g., Benjamin A. Templin, State
at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
Law, Research Paper No. 1428108,2009),
availableat
1428108, 2009), available
papers.cfm?abstracUd=
08.
1428108.
papers.cfm?abstract id= 14281
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governance as well as the TARP
TARP bailout
bailout policy
policy as articulated
articulated by
by Congress
Congress
governance
and the
the executive
executive branch. Part
Part III then closely
closely examines
examines the
the government's
government's
and
begins with
with the
the closest
closest parallel
parallel to the
the current
current
actions as an equity holder. It begins
actions
situation,
the
Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation's
(FDIC)
1984
Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) 1984
situation,
acquisition of an eighty percent
percent ownership
ownership interest in the public
public holding
acquisition
company of Continental
National Bank and Trust
Trust Co. (Continental
(Continental
Continental Illinois National
company
Illinois), which
which was,
was, before its failure, one of the ten largest banks in the
Illinois),
32
United States. 32
The paper then
then looks at the 2008-09
2008-09 bailouts of AIG,
AIG,
The
United
Citigroup, GM, Chrysler
Chrysler and Ally
Ally and shows that the government
government has
Citigroup,
developed aa policy
policy for how it acts as a shareholder.
shareholder.
Moreover,
developed
notwithstanding the government's
government's assertions
assertions of
of aa "reluctant
"reluctant shareholder"
shareholder"
notwithstanding
government has
has been
been deeply involved
involved in these
these companies as a
policy, the government
creditor, regulator, and legislator.
Part IV,
N, I argue that government intervention
intervention in business has
Finally, in Part
become sufficiently
sufficiently regular
regular that the government
government should develop policies for
become
the future so that its actions are more forthright and transparent. To that
three suggestions.
suggestions. First,
end, I set forth a modest proposal
proposal consisting
consisting of three
when Treasury is a substantial
substantial shareholder, it should work with corporate
management to provide regularly
regularly the general
general public
public with clear specific
specific
statements about government
government intervention
intervention and its effect on the corporation.
statements
entitled to more information
information because
because this is not "business
"business as
The public
public is entitled
usual."
second and third proposals
proposals contemplate
contemplate that the government
government
usual." The second
substantial shareholder
select
shareholder and select
exercise the customary power of a substantial
will exercise
directors that will represent the taxpayers'
taxpayers' interests in the boardroom.
Specifically, as the second
second proposal, when Treasury is a substantial
in
a
public
corporation, it should use its power to nominate and
shareholder
corporation,
shareholder
directors, who would serve
serve on the
run its own nominees for the board of directors,
representatives of Treasury in order to represent
represent the interests of the
board as representatives
U.S. taxpayer. Third, when Treasury, as a shareholder
shareholder in either a public or
private corporation,
corporation, has the power to elect or appoint directors, it should
Treasury officials
officials to those directorships.
select at least some high-level Treasury
Unlike directors who come from the business sector, they will be able to
present the government's perspectives
perspectives and concerns
concerns to management
management and the
other members of the board. They, in tum,
turn, will have greater knowledge
and understanding about the corporation that the government substantially
owns. Treasury's
participation in the corporate boardroom
boardroom could
Treasury's active participation
promote greater understanding
understanding of the respective positions of government
and business and alleviate some of the tensions and conflicts resulting from
the uneasy alliance
alliance of government and business.

32
32

FED. DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT INS.
INS. CORP.,
CORP., MANAGING
MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND
AND RTC
FED.
RTC
EXPERIENCE 1980-1994,
(1998).
1980-1994, at 545-65 (1998).
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AND THE BAILOUT
II. PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE AND
BAILOUT
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATION

A.

Governance
Principles
CorporateGovernance
Principlesof Corporate

of
I begin with a summary review of well-established
well-established principles
principles of
of
corporate governance.
governance. A corporation's
corporation's objective
objective is "the
"the conduct
conduct of
corporate profit
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and
business
3
shareholder gain."
gain.,,33
The corporation,
corporation, however, may take into account
ethical considerations
considerations and support public welfare and other purposes,
34 Accordingly,
Accordingly, the
whether or not they advance the economic objective.34
corporate objective is primarily to earn profits within a broad concept of
of
"profits," short or long-term.
"profits,"

Under the accepted director primacy
primacy model,35
model,35 the board of directors has
broad discretion to determine the appropriate
appropriate balancing
balancing of these
exercising this discretion, directors are expected
considerations. In exercising
expected to act in
considerations.
interests of the corporation
corporation3366 and to live up to
good faith and in the best interests
38
37
their duties of loyalty
loyalty37
and care. 38
If they do so, the business judgment rule
protects the directors from liability for bad decisions. In the last two
of
majority of
decades, a board of directors consisting of at least a majority
independene3 9 directors has become
become the model
model for corporate governance at
independent
40 Thus, in public corporations, the role of the board has
public corporations.
corporations.40
changed from determining corporate business policy (for which experience
experience
changed
and expertise in the specific business would be required) to monitoring the
corporate managers
managers (for which general business experience
experience and gravitas are
corporate
valued). The typical independent
independent director today is an experienced
experienced
businessman, typically a retired CEO, who may sit on several other boards.
An integral
integral function of the monitoring board is to assure that the
corporation has in place
place adequate
adequate systems and controls to assure that the

33

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§
(1994).
2.01(a) (1994).
34
34 !d.
2.01(b).
Id. §§ 2.01(b).
3s
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
14 1(a) (2010); MODEL BUS.
8.0 1(b)
35 DEL. CODE. ANN.
Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01(b)
(2005).
36 MODEL Bus. CORP.
36
CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)
8.30(a) (2005).
3 DEL. CODE ANN.
37
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010);
(2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2005).
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
38 Graham
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also
also
MODEL Bus. CORP.
CORP. ACT § 8.30(b)
8.30(b) (2005).
(2005).
3 Definitions of "independent
INC., MARKET
39
"independent directors"
directors" are found in NASDAQ,
NASDAQ, INC.,
RULES], available
availableat
PLACE RULES § 5605(a)(2)
5605(a)(2) (2006) [hereinafter
[hereinafter NASDAQ
NASDAQ RULES],
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.comINASDAQ/pdflnew
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/new _listingJules.pdf;
listingrules.pdf; NYSE,
NYSE, INC.,
INC.,
NYSE
MANUAL].
[hereinafter
LISTED
COMPANY
MANUAL
§
303A.02
(2010)
[hereinafter
NYSE
MANUAL].
303A.02
(2010)
MANUAL
40
NASDAQ RULES
RULES §§ 5605(b)(l);
5605(b)(1); NYSE
303A.01.
40 NASDAQ
NYSE MANUAL
MANUAL § 303A.01.
33
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corporation complies
complies with
with the
the law
law441' and
and adequately
adequately manages
manages enterprise
enterprise
corporation
42 Even before the
42
financial crisis, this model
model of corporate
corporate governance
governance
risks. Even before the financial
had its
its critics,43
critics,43 and the deficiencies
deficiencies in risk assessment
assessment on the part of
of
and boards
boards of banks and financial
financial services
services firms raise
raise again the
managers and
of the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of the monitoring
monitoring board
board and
and the director
director
question of
model. 44
primacy model."
The role of
of the shareholders
corporate governance
governance is, first and
and
shareholders in corporate
The
directors and, as a corollary,
corollary, to remove directors
directors if
if
foremost, to elect the directors
the confidence
confidence of the shareholders.
shareholders.4455 As a practical
practical matter,
they have lost the
directors' elections
elections are rarely contested,
contested, and directors
directors are
are seldom
seldom
however, directors'
well-funded effort to take control of the board,
board,
removed unless
unless part of a well-funded
removed
446
6
frequently
to
redeem
a
poison
pill.
Shareholders
power
to
the
power
also
have
Shareholders
frequently
certain major corporate
corporate decisions proposed by the board
board of directors,
veto certain
47 or amendments
such as a merger
merger or sale of all the assets 47
amendments to the certificate
certificate
48 Consistent with their passive
incorporation.48
passive role, shareholders
shareholders have
of incorporation.
limited rights to obtain information
information about the company that is not disclosed
in SEC and other public
public filings.
filings.499 In
In addition,
addition, shareholders
shareholders generally
generally do not
not
owe any duties
duties to their fellow shareholders; they are free to act in a selftheir
interested
and do not have to take
take into account the effect of their
interested manner and
actions on fellow shareholders.5050 "Controlling"
"Controlling" shareholders,
shareholders, however,

SENTENCING GUIDELINES
GUIDELINES MANUAL
41 U.S. SENTENCING
MANUAL § 8B2.
8B2.1(a)(2)
MODEL Bus.
I (a)(2) (2007); MODEL
CORP. ACT § 8.01(c)(iv) (2005).
(2005).

See generally
generally MODEL
MODEL Bus.
Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.0
1(c)(ii), (vi); COMM. OF SPONSORING
SPONSORING
See
CORP. ACT
8.01(c)(ii),
ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, EFFECTIVE ENTERPRISE RISK OVERSIGHT: THE
ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2009).
ShareholdersSet the Rules, 119 HARV.
43 See,
HARv. L.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders
REv.
REV. 1784 (2006).
J.
Management,34 J.
44
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark
Enterprise Risk Management,
andEnterprise
Caremarkand
4See
(2009) (reporting results of a 2002
2002 survey of corporate
corporate
CORP. L. 967, 970-71 (2009)
directors in which
which forty-three percent said that their board had ineffective,
directors
ineffective, or no,
process for identifying and managing risk and a 2008 survey of CFOs who
see
expressed concern
concern about their own companies'
practices); see
companies' risk management practices);
Pleads
Martin Sullivan
Sullivan Pleads
Andrew Clark, US Politicians
also
as Ex-AIG Boss Martin
PoliticiansAmazed as
also Andrew
Ignorance,
1, 2010, at 24.
GUARDIAN, July 1,2010,
Ignorance,GUARDIAN,
§§
45
4 DEL. CODE ANN.
ANN. tit. 8, §§
§§ 141(b),
141(b), (k), 211(b)(201O);
211(b) (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§
7.01,808
808 (2005).
7.01,
46 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case
Casefor Increasing
ShareholderPower,
Power, 118 HARv.
Increasing Shareholder
HARV.
L. REv.
hostile-takeover context,
REV. 833, 856 (2005) (stating that outside the hostile-takeover
challenges to incumbent
incumbent directors are rare).
47
47 DEL. CODE ANN.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§
ANN. tit.
tit. 8, §§
§§ 251, 271 (2010); MODEL
§§ 11.02,
11.02,
12.02 (2002).
MODEL BuS. CORP.
CORP. ACT § 10.02 (2005).
48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242 (2010); MODEL
49
MODEL Bus.
BUS. CORP.
CORP. ACT §§ 16.02,16.04
16.02, 16.04
49
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 220 (2010); MODEL
(2005).
50
50 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION
AND ECONOMICS §§ 7.4 (2002).
CORPORATION LAW AND

42
42
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equitable limitations
limitations placed
placed on their power
power to
to extract
extract value
value from the
have equitable
corporation to the detriment
detriment of
of minority
minority shareholders.'
shareholders. 51
corporation
contrast to the director
director primacy
primacy model, shareholder
shareholder activists seek
seek a
In contrast
greater voice for shareholders
shareholders in corporate
corporate governance.
governance.
greater
While the
shareholder activist movement
movement is not monolithic,
monolithic, an
an overarching
overarching theme is
is
shareholder
greater
accountability
shareholders. Some
corporate board to the shareholders.
greater accountability of the corporate
advocates for greater
greater shareholder
shareholder empowerment
empowerment argue for limits on the
advocates
52
board's discretion
discretion in order to maximize
maximize shareholder
shareholder value
value5 2 and specifically
specifically
board's
seek to curtail
curtail the
the board's
board's power to adopt
adopt "poison
"poison pills"
pills" without
seek
of
shareholder approval."
approval. 53
Other advocates
advocates want to make
make the election
election of
Other
shareholder
directors a more meaningful
meaningful exercise
exercise of
of shareholder
shareholder voting rights
rights by
by
directors
allowing shareholders
shareholders access
access to the
the management
management proxy
proxy statement
statement for
allowing
54
nomination of directors.54
recent years,
years, many shareholder
shareholder groups have
In recent
nomination
compensation packages for senior
senior
generous executive compensation
focused on generous
on
shareholder vote on
management and advocate for a nonbinding shareholder
management
55
compensation
pay,,).55
Shareholder activism, however, is not a call
Shareholder
compensation ("say on pay").
corporate norm, but rather argues for some
for a radical restructuring
restructuring of the corporate
limitations on board power in order to realize shareholder
shareholder value or achieve
56
greater accountability.56
Finally, although
although creditors
creditors are not formally part of the corporate
considerable power
governance
power
governance structure, major creditors can wield considerable
because they can negotiate for controls on the corporation
protect their
corporation to protect
because
shareholders."57
investment that are more extensive than those possessed by shareholders.
Creditors owe no fiduciary
fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders. 58

51Id.
51 Id.
52 Bebchuk, supra
52 Bebchuk, supra
note 46, at 911.
911.
5 See, e.g., Bebchuk
53
Bebchuk v. CA, Inc.,
Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 739, 743 (Del.
(Del. Ch. 2006).
54 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Corporate
54
Corporate Governance
Policies, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
GovernancePolicies,
INVESTORS,
3.2, http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov%20
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%2OCorp%2OGov%20
INVESTORS, § 3.2,
Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2009-29-1
0%20FINAL.pdf (last updated
updated
Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2009-29-10%20FINAL.pdf
Sept. 29, 2010).
55
ARP recipients to adopt say-on-pay, see infra
infra
TARP
5s In response, Congress required T
RELIEF
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM,
REpORT TO CONGRESS
CONGRESS 118 (July 21,
21, 2009) [hereinafter
QUARTERLY REPORT
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY
infra note 72 and
SIGTARP,
CONGRESS July 2009]; see infra
REPORT TO CONGRESS
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT
accompanying
accompanying text.
56
Council, THE COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
56 See, e.g., About the Council,
INVESTORS
"[g]ood corporate
2010) (stating that "[g]ood
http://www.cii.org/about
21,2010)
http://www.cii.org/about (last visited July 21,
governance
governance is a system of checks and balances that fosters transparency,
responsibility, accountability
accountability and market integrity").
5 See generally
generally Kelli A. Alces, Strategic
StrategicGovernance,
Governance, 50 ARIZ. L.
L. REv.
REV. 1053
1053
57
(2008).
A.2d
N.Am. Catholic
Catholic Educ.
Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
58 See N.
92, 99
(Del.
2007).
99
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government embraced the director primacy
primacy
As I discuss later, the government
model, with its emphasis on independent directors overseeing
overseeing the business
business
and a "hands-off'
"hands-off' shareholder
shareholder policy. The government, however, has not
elect
exercised its power as a significant shareholder
shareholder to nominate and elect
directors charged
charged with the responsibility
represent the U.S.
U.S. taxpayers'
taxpayers'
responsibility to represent
interests in the boardroom.
Congressional legislation authorizing
We turn next to Congressional
authorizing the bailout to
ascertain Congress's
Congress's expectations
expectations with respect to corporate governance.
Legislation
B. The Bailout
Bailout Legislation

In EESA, Congress made clear its expectation
expectation that Treasury would
seek to maximize investment
investment returns in order to minimize the impact on the
national debt. 599 Consistent with this, it specifically
specifically directed Treasury, when
providing assistance to an exchange-traded
exchange-traded financial institution, to take an
60 Congress,
equity interest to allow for the potential of upside gain.60
equity
Treasury would exercise
however, did not expect that Treasury
exercise rights as a
shareholder; the statute directs the Treasury Secretary to agree not to
shareholder;
exercise voting power if it acquires voting stock.'
stoCk.61 It is not clear why
exercise
Congress did not want Treasury to vote; it may reflect either a general
Congress
disinclination
policy grounds or a specific distrust of how the executive
disinclination on policy
department might exercise
exercise voting power. It is incongruous, however, to
department
shareholder
policy of shareholder
maximization while denying the shareholder
shareholder maximization
adopt a policy
exercised its voting
voting power. As we will see later, the government has exercised
rights, albeit in a limited fashion.
assistance, the most
most
Congress also attached conditions to TARP
T ARP assistance,
Congress
All
significant of which relate to controls on executive compensation. All
TARP recipients are subject to executive compensation
compensation restrictions. So
TARP
ARP recipient
recipient has an outstanding "obligation"
"obligation" to the federal
TARP
long as the T
compensation
executive compensation
government, it must comply with guidelines on executive
promulgated by Treasury, currently
currently set forth in its Interim
Interim Final Rule on
on
promulgated
Governance (the
TARP Standards
Standards for Compensation
Corporate Governance
Compensation and Corporate
TARP
62
"Rule,,).62
Treasury created the Office of Special Master for TARP
Treasury
"Rule").
Master"), whose responsibilities
Executive Compensation
Compensation (the "Special
"Special Master"),
Executive
include reviewing and approving executive
executive compensation
compensation of T
ARP
TARP
as
follows:
recipients,
recipients,

59
5213
103(1), 12 U.S.c.A.
U.S.C.A. §§ 5213
of 2008 §§ 103(1),
59 Emergency Economic
Economic Stabilization Act of2008
(West 2006).
60 12 U.S.C. § 5223 (2006).
60 12 U.S.C.
§ 5223
61
61

id
!d.

62
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR
INSPECTOR GEN.
GEN. FOR
62 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY
QUARTERLY REpORT
[hereinafter
REPORT TO CONGRESS 101 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter
PROGRAM,
REpORT TO CONGRESS
CONGRESS Jan. 2010].
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY
QUARTERLY REPORT
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*•

Review
Review and
and approve
approve any
any payments
payments of
of compensation
compensation for their
their five
executive officers
officers ("SEOs") and twenty next
next highly
highly paid
paid
senior executive
employees of TARP
TARP recipients
recipients that
that have
have received
received "exceptional
"exceptional
employees
63
assistance'
,,,63
assistance;"

*•

Review and approve
approve the structure
structure of compensation
compensation of TARP
TARP
that have received exceptional
exceptional assistance
assistance for their
their
recipients that
highly paid employees;6
employees;64
hundred most highly

•*

Review
Review bonuses,
bonuses, retention
retention awards, and other compensation
compensation paid
paid to
employees before
SEOs and the twenty
twenty next most highly paid
paid employees
SEOs
February 17,
17, 2009, by
by all TARP
TARP recipients
recipients and, where
where appropriate,
appropriate,
February
negotiate reimbursements;
reimbursements;
negotiate

•*

Provide advisory
advisory opinions with respect
respect to the application
application of the
compensation payments
payments and plans are consistent
consistent
Rule and whether compensation
65
public interest.65
with law and the public

The Special Master is required to use specific principles
principles in his review
review
of compensation
compensation arrangements, including:

*•

"risk-the compensation
compensation structure should avoid incentives
incentives for
for
excessive risks that could
employees to take unnecessary or excessive
could
TARP recipient..."
recipient ... "
threaten the value of the TARP
threaten

•*

compensation structure ...
... should reflect
"tax payer return-the compensation
reflect the
need for the T
ARP recipient
recipient to remain a competitive
competitive enterprise,
enterprise, to
TARP
employees who will contribute
contribute to the
retain and recruit talented employees
TARP recipient's future success,
success, and ultimately to be able to repay
repay
66
TARP obligations.,,66
'
obligations."

relevant considerations
allocation of the
appropriate allocation
considerations include appropriate
Other relevant
(salary, pensions, bonuses
bonuses and incentives),
components of compensation
incentives),
compensation (salary,
and
payments,
and
performance-based
compensation,
comparable
structures
performance-based compensation, comparable
67
employee contribution
contribution to the T
ARP recipient's value.
TARP
63 Recipients of exceptional assistance include AIG, GM, GMAC, and
63
Recipients of exceptional assistance include AIG, GM, GMAC, and Chrysler. It
SIGTARP
ARP QUARTERLY
previously included Citigroup and Bank of America. See SIGT
REpORT
55, at 123.
123.
supranote 55,
REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra
64
According to the Treasury, this is to ensure that compensation is fair and
64 According
structured, to protect taxpayer interests and to promote long-term shareholder
shareholder
Id.
value. Id
65 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note
102.
65
SIGTARP , QUARTERLY REpORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 102.
66 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra
66
SIGT
ARP
,
QUARTERLY
REpORT
TO
CONGRESS
July
2009,
supra
note
55,
at
122.
67

Id. at
at 123;
123; see
see also
also Compensation
Compensationin
in the
the Financial
FinancialIndustry-Government
Industry-Government
67Id
(2010)
Cong. (2010)
Perspectives:
111th Congo
Fin.Servs., lllth
H. Comm. on Fin.
Before the H
HearingBefore
Perspectives:Hearing
U.S.
ARP Exec. Comp., U.S.
(testimony of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for T
TARP
Department
(describing the variables and considerations at issue
Department of the Treasury) (describing
when
when determining whether compensation levels or structures are appropriate).

HeinOnline -- 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 570 2010

2010
2010

us. as "Reluctant
"Reluctant Shareholder":
Shareholder":
The U.S.
Government, Business and the Law

571
571

In addition,
addition, the American
American Recovery
Recovery and
and Reinvestment
Reinvestment Act
Act of 2009
2009
In
on
(ARRA),68
as
implemented
by
the
Rule,
provides
additional
controls
on
controls
additional
for
the
Rule,
provides
implemented by
(ARRA) ,
executive compensation.
compensation. Each TARP
TARP recipient
recipient must establish
establish a board
executive
independent directors, whose
compensation committee
committee consisting of independent
compensation
responsibilities include
include meeting
meeting at least semi-annually
semi-annually to review
review with
with senior
senior
responsibilities
of all employees
employees and to
officers the proposed
proposed compensation
compensation plans of
risk officers
69
In
In
ensure that the TARP recipient is not unnecessarily
unnecessarily exposed
exposed to risk.69
ensure
to
plans
addition,
the
committee
must
evaluate
SE~
compensation
ensure
SEO
compensation
committee must evaluate
addition,
plans do not encourage
encourage the SEOs to take unnecessary
unnecessary and excessive
excessive
that the plans
the TARP
TARP recipient and file reports
that could threaten
threaten the
the value
value of the
risks that
Treasury on its work.7700
with the Treasury

TARP recipients also are required,
required, under ARRA: to permit
permit an annual
TARP
non-binding vote by the shareholders
shareholders on executive
executive compensation
compensation ("say on
non-binding
required by SEC regulations;71
company-wide policies to
regulations;7 1 to adopt company-wide
pay") as required
define and prevent
prevent excessive
excessive expenditures
expenditures on entertainment
entertainment and
and other
72 and to require
"luxury"
expenses;72
require that bonuses
bonuses paid to SEOs and the next
"luxury" expenses;
payment
twenty most highly paid employees
employees be subject to a clawback
clawback if the payment
773
Golden
was based on materially
materially inaccurate
inaccurate performance
performance criteria. '
SE~ or the next five mostly highly paid
paid employees
employees
parachute payments to a SEO
parachute
74
are prohibited.74
In addition to the Congressionally
mandated provisions, Treasury
Congressionally mandated
imposed additional
additional requirements to protect shareholder
shareholder value and increase
transparency, including a prohibition
prohibition on tax gross-ups, a requirement that
requirement
T
ARP recipients
recipients provide
provide additional disclosure of perquisites, a requirement
TARP
that T
ARP recipients
recipients provide disclosure about compensation
TARP
compensation consultants,
consultants,
and certification
certification and reporting requirements.7755
executive compensation
compensation reflect Congressional
Congressional and
The restrictions on executive
public anger
anger over large
large compensation
executives of failed
compensation packages paid to executives
of
firms/7 66 as well as the conventional
conventional wisdom that many forms of
firms,

American Recovery
Recovery and
and Reinvestment
Reinvestment Act
Act of
of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5,
American
U.S. C.).
123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.).
69 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra
69 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT TO CONGRESS
supra note 55, at 124.
7°Id.
710 Id.
Id.
72 Id.
id.
72
n Jd.
Id. at 121.
121. The rule also requires that the TARP recipient exercise
clawback
73
exercise its clawback
rights
unless
it
can
demonstrate
that
it
would
be
unreasonable
to
do
so.
rights unless it can demonstrate
74 Jd.
id
75
751Jd.
Id. at 125-26.
76 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, Mass Hysteria
76 See, e.g., Michael
Lewis, Mass Hysteria Over AIG Obscures
Obscures Simple Truths,
Truths,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601039&sid=atlHxXH7FweQ
("[T]he one thing you can do right now in
20601039&sid=atlHxXH7FweQ ("[T]he
Washington without getting an argument is to rail against the ethics of AlG's
AIG's bonus
payment.").
68

68
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performance-based incentive
incentive compensation
compensation encouraged
encouraged managers
managers to
to engage
engage
performance-based
as aa measure
measure of
of
excessive risk-taking
risk-taking by
by focusing on
on stock price
price as
in excessive
performance.7777 Congress
Congress consistently stated that these provisions
provisions were
performance.
78
trust,78
an open question
question whether
necessary to restore shareholder
shareholder trust,
whether
but it is an
necessary
Congress intended to adopt a corporate
corporate governance
governance model
model with greater
greater
Congress
emphasis on
on shareholder
shareholder rights
rights or was
was simply
simply responding
responding to constituents'
constituents'
emphasis
anger. Assuming
Assuming Congress
Congress did intend the former, the legislative measures
measures
radical measures.
measures.
The government
government can veto
veto executive
executive
are not radical
companies receiving
receiving "exceptional
"exceptional assistance;"
assistance;"
compensation only
only of those companies
compensation
TARP recipients,
recipients, the Special
Special Master's
Master's power
power is strictly
strictly
other TARP
with respect to other
79
Exchange-traded corporations
corporations have
have been
been required
required since the
jaw-boning.79
Exchange-traded
jaw-boning.
(SOX) to have
have independent
independent compensation
compensation
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
8
committees;80
clawbacks
were
first
instituted
in
SOX;81
and
"say
SOX; i
"say on pay"
committees;s0 clawbacks were
have routinely been
been included
included on management
management proxy
resolutions have
82 Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, some corporations
corporations found these conditions
conditions
statements.82
statements.
TARP
sufficiently
incentive to repay
repay the T
ARP
burdensome that they created an incentive
sufficiently burdensome
funds, and most large
large bank recipients
recipients repaid
repaid their TARP
TARP funds in order
order to
83
get out from these
these restrictions. 81
long-term solutions to
The Dodd-Frank
Dodd-Frank Act that is intended to provide long-term
problems gives the best evidence
evidence of the current
current Congressional
Congressional
these problems
commitment
to
corporate
governance
reform.
The
Act
contains
provisions
contains provisions
corporate governance
commitment
n7 See William
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case
Case Against Shareholder
Shareholder
77
William W. Bratton &
Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REv. 653 (2010). But see Sanjai Bhagat &
& Roberta
Empowerment, 158
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:
Compensation: Simplicity,
Simplicity, Transparency
Transparencyand
Committing
Paper No.
& Econ. Research, Working Paper
Committing to the Long-Term 33 (Yale Law &
393,2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1506742
http://ssm.com/abstract=1506742 (stating that best
393, 2009), available
available evidence
evidence suggests that incentive compensation
compensation did not affect performance
performance
of financial institutions
institutions during the financial crisis).
& Wachter, supra
supranote 77, at 657 (quoting
78 See Bratton &
(quoting former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt that ''the
subprime collapse,
collapse, the Bear Steams implosion, and
"the subprime
revelations of poor risk management at large financial firms 'had
'had injected aa
markets,' and that restoring the
dangerously large degree of mistrust into markets,'
shareholder voice 'would
'would go a long way in helping to restore trust"').
79 SIGTARP,
REPORT TO CONGRESS
CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra
79
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT
supra note 62, at 10210205. Mr. Feinberg
ARP recipients that have received
received
TARP
Feinberg maintains a mandatory role in T
"exceptional assistance,"
assistance," including the review of the payments of compensation
"exceptional
compensation
and the structure of the payments for the 100 most highly compensated employees.
Mr. Feinberg plays an advisory role in his review of prior payments and in his
"interpretation"
ARP recipient institutions.
TARP
"interpretation" of current compensation plans at all T
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); 15
15
80 See Sarbanes-Oxley
U.S.c.
§
78j-1(m)(3)(A)
(2002).
U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A)
81
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 7243(a)(1)
7243(a)(1) (2006).
82 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
82 See, e.g., Marathon Oil
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 147282 (Jan. 8,
8,
2010).
83 Bank ofAmerica to Repay TARP, Raise Cash, ASSOCIATED
2, 2009,
83 Bank ofAmerica to
Repay TARP, Raise Cash, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2,2009,
available
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34245560/ns/business-us _ business/.
availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/34245560/ns/business-us
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573

on executive
executive compensation,
compensation, compensation
compensation committees
committees and
and "say
"say on pay"
pay"
on
84
84
Act
The
that
are
substantially
the
same
as
those
in
the
T
ARP
legislation.
The
Act
TARP legislation.
same as those
that are substantially
85
5
8
also adds
adds additional
additional disclosures
disclosures and
and authorization
authorization for the
the SEC
SEC to
to grant
grant
also
shareholders proxy
proxy access
access to
to nominate
nominate directors.
directors.8866 Most
Most likely,
likely, Congress
Congress
shareholders
as symbolic
symbolic of
of shareholder
shareholder protection
protection rather
rather than
viewed these
these provisions
provisions as
viewed
effecting meaningful
meaningful change.
change.
effecting
C. The Administration's
Administration's Guiding Principles
Principles

Consistent with
with the Congressional
Congressional directive
directive to
to take
take equity
equity investments
investments
Consistent
8 7 most outstanding TARP
return,87
funds, as of
of midto maximize
maximize investment
investment return,
most outstanding TARP funds,
to
the form of equity
equity ownership
ownership in troubled companies,
companies,
2010, are in the
principally in common
common and preferred
preferred stock. 88 Specifically,
Specifically, the U.S.
U.S.
principally
in two public
public corporations:
corporations: 79.77%
government
substantial interests
interests in
government holds substantial
89 and
of the voting power of
of AIG
AIG89
and approximately
approximately eighteen
eighteen percent
percent of the
of
Citigroup
(down
from
33.6%
at
December
2009).90 The
common
stock
2009).90
of Citigroup (down
common
maj ority interests
interests in two private corporationscorporationsgovernment also owns majority
government
92
GM991'and
and 56.3% of Ally
Alll2
well as a 9.85%
60.8% of GM
as well
9.85% interest in Chrysler,
interest in AIG is in the form of a
corporation. 93 The voting interest
also a private corporation.
Ally are
preferred
equity interests in Citigroup,
Citigroup, GM, Chrysler and Ally
preferred stock; the equity
in common
common shares. The decision to take these substantial holdings in
common shares was driven by the inability of the firms to take on more
necessity
debt given the precarious condition
condition of their balance sheets. The necessity
placed an
services firms to maintain minimum levels of capital placed
for financial services
94
and GM and
debt,94
upper limit on the amount of Citigroup's and Ally's debt,

84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Street Reform
Reform and
and Consumer
Consumer Protection
Protection Act §§ 951-54, Pub. L.
84 Dodd-Frank Wall
No. 111-203,
124
Stat.
1376
(July
2010)
(to
be
codified
codified in scattered sections and
111-203,
U.S. C.).
titles of U.S.C.).
85Id.
id. §§ 956 (compensation structure);
(employee and director hedging); id.
85 Id. §§ 955 (employee
id.
§
972
(chairman
and
CEO
structures).
id.
§
86
Id. §§971
971 (proxy
(proxy access).
access).
86 !d.
87
See
supra
note 60
60 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
87 See supra note
88
SIGTARP,
QUARTERLY
REPORT TO
TO CONGRESS
CONGRESS Apr.
Apr. 2010, supra
supra note 3, at 34.
88 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT
89
supra note 19, at 27.
REPORT 2009, supra
89 OFS FINANCIAL REpORT
note 62, at 72.
90
supranote
TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra
REPORT TO
90 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT
91
U.S.
GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
TROUBLED
ASSET
RELIEF
PROGRAM:
PROGRAM: THE
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
91
U.S. GOVERNMENT
ROLE
AS
SHAREHOLDER
IN
AIG,
CITIGROUP,
CHRYSLER,
AND
AIG,
IN
GOVERNMENT
MANAGEMENT
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
GENERAL MOTORS AND
AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON ITS INVESTMENT
ACTIVITIES, GAL-10-3257,
[hereinafter GAO, THE U.S.
11 (2009) [hereinafter
at 11
GAL-10-3257, at
GOVERNMENT
SHAREHOLDER].
GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER]'
92 SIGT
SIGTARP,
REPORT TO
TO CONGRESS
CONGRESS Apr.
Apr. 2010, supra
supra note
note 3, at 116.
116.
92
ARP , QUARTERLY REpORT
11.
91, at 11.
note 91,
supranote
93
AS SHAREHOLDER, supra
GOVERNMENT ROLE AS
See GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
9 See
94
the government's
government's spring
followed the
of additional
additional capital followed
94 Government infusions
infusions of
2009 stress
stress testing
testing of banks.
banks. See Press Release,
Release, U.S. Dep't
Dep't of
of the Treasury,
Treasury,
the Treasury
Treasury Capital
Statement From
Treasury
Secretary
Tim
Geithner
Regarding
the
Geithner
Secretary
From
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Chrysler, emerging
emerging from
from government-engineered
government-engineered bankruptcies,
bankruptcies, needed
needed
95
of capital.
capital.
dictated the form of
of
infusions of
Thus, the business needs dictated
infusions
investment as least
least as much
much as the Congressional
Congressional goal
goal of
of maximizing
maximizing
investment
taxpayers' gain.
taxpayers'
96
"reluctant shareholder."
shareholder.,,96
Indeed, Treasury has repeatedly
repeatedly stated
stated it isis aa "reluctant
Indeed,
its mission statement
statement it states: "We
"We want to see
see the
the capital
capital base of our
our
In its
financial system return
return to private hands
hands as quickly
quickly as
as possible, while
while
financial
97
preserving financial stability
stability and
and promoting
promoting economic
recovery.,,97
economic recovery."
preserving

Treasury has set forth its Managing
Managing Guiding
Guiding Principles
Principles as follows:
*•

Protect taxpayer
taxpayer investments
investments and
and maximize
maximize overall investment
investment
Protect
competing constraints;
returns within competing

*•

Promote
Promote stability for and prevent disruption
disruption of financial
financial markets
and economy;

*•

Bolster market confidence
confidence to increase
increase private
private capital
capital investment;
investment;
Bolster

*•

Dispose of investments as soon as practicable
practicable in a timely and
and
Dispose
orderly manner
manner that minimizes financial'
market and economic
economic
financial market
98
impact.98

These principles, however, do not acknowledge
acknowledge the intractable
conflicts
intractable conflicts
These
confronting
government as shareholder. The first principle, for
confronting the government
example,
suggests a
investment-which suggests
"protecting" the investment-which
example, calls for "protecting"
conservative
"maximizing"
strategy-while at the same time "maximizing"
conservative business strategy-while
returns, which connotes an aggressive business strategy, all within
amorphous "competing
"competing constraints."
position that it is a
constraints." Consistent with its position
amorphous
"reluctant
shareholder," the fourth principle calls for prompt divestiture, but
"reluctant shareholder,"
minimize market and economic impact. The second
second and third
it has to minimize
principles reflect concerns
concerns beyond investment retinns
returns and focus instead on
principles
a general policy goal-the well-being of capital markets. If these principles
principles
all carry equal weight (and Treasury has not indicated that it weights them),
then there are potentially serious conflicts that Treasury has not
"steward of the U.S.
acknowledged in its dual roles as shareholder and "steward
acknowledged
7,
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 7,
Assistance Program and the Supervisory
2009), available
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg123.htm.
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tgl23.htm.
95
198-200 and accompanying text. It is not clear why the
infra notes 198-200
9s See infra
infra note
government
government felt the necessity of putting so much capital into Ally. See infra
240 and accompanying
accompanying text.
96
96 OFS FINANCIAL
FINANCIAL REpORT
REPORT 2009, supra
supra note 19, at 42.
of
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Text of
9 Press Release U.S.
97
Letter from Secretary
on Administration's Exit
Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on
Strategy for T
ARP (Dec. 9, 2009), available
http://www.treas.gov/press/
availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/
TARP
releases/tg433.htm.
98
at 39-40.
supra note 19, at
REPORT 2009, supra
FINANCIAL REpORT
98 OFS FINANCIAL
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economic and financial systems,,,99
exacerbated because
because
systems,"99 conflicts that are exacerbated
economic
shareholder and its concomitant
concomitant obligation
obligation to
of its power as controlling shareholder
shareholders.
other shareholders.
Treasury articulates
articulates a policy of shareholder restraint. It has
Finally, Treasury
stated that, in its view, it would be inappropriate
inappropriate to exercise its voting
voting
power except on matters that directly pertain to its responsibility under
00
EESA to manage
manage its investments in a manner that protects the taxpayer.'
taxpayer. 100
EESA
governance model of
of
Treasury thus has adopted
adopted the prevailing corporate
corporate governance
0
director primacy:'
primacy:101' a strong board of directors, no interference
interference in day-today management
shareholder
management decisions, and limited voting rights on core shareholder
02
issues.
issues.1102
Treasury imposed
imposed additional requirements
requirements on those companies
recelvmg "exceptional
controls,
receiving
"exceptional assistance,,,103
assistance,"' 0 3 including internal controls,
monitoring and reporting requirements, and additional
additional restrictions on
104 Creditors and senior
expenditures.
senior security
security holders frequently
frequently bargain
bargain
expenditures."'
for such protections, and they are appropriate
protection of the
appropriate for the protection
employees from Treasury's Office
Office of
government investments. In addition, employees
of
Financial Stability (OFS) have met with exceptional
assistance
corporations
exceptional
to discuss the company's
company's governance
governance structure and processes related to
T
ARP requirements.105
requirements. 105
TARP

SHAREHOLDER: PAST AND
AND PRESENT
GOVERNMENT AS
III. THE GOVERNMENT
AS SHAREHOLDER:
In this Part, I describe specifically how the government
government has acted in its
FDIC's
role of shareholder. I begin, for the sake of comparison,
comparison, with the FDIC's
acquisition, in 1984, of an eighty percent interest in the public holding
holding
company
Continental Illinois and then proceed to examine the 2008-09
company of Continental
Citigroup, the automakers,
bailouts of AIG, Citigroup,
automakers, and Ally.

99

99 Duties
& Functions
Department of Treasury,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE
Duties &
Functionsof the U.S. Department
Treasury,U.S.
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/educationlduties/
TREASURY,
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/ (last update May 25,2010)
25, 2010)
100
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
100 Press Release, U.S.
Announces Voting of its
Shares at Citigroup
Citigroup Annual Meeting (Apr. 20,
20,2010),
2010), available
availableat
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg647.htm.
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg647.htm.
101
141(a);
accompanying text.
1(a); supra
supra note 35 and accompanying
1o1 See DEL. CODE. ANN.
ANN. tit. 8, § 14
102 GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91,
102
GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra
91, at 12.
12.
103 AIG, GM, GMAC and Chrysler were exceptional assistance
\03 AIG, GM, GMAC and Chrysler were exceptional assistance recipients.
recipients.
Citigroup repaid
repaid its exceptional
exceptional assistance
assistance loans in December
December 2009. SIGTARP,
Citigroup
QUARTERLY
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS
2010, supra
supra note 62, at 135-36.
CONGRESS Jan. 2010,
135-36.

104
Id. at 135.
'0 Id.
135.

Id.I d.

105
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Continental Illinois
Illinois
A. Continental
The FDIC's 1984
1984 bailout of Continental
Continental Illinois
Illinois engendered
engendered
The
06 and
"too big to fail,"
fail,,,106
and raised
raised concerns
concerns
controversy, coined
coined the phrase
phrase "too
controversy,
07
about moral hazard.'
hazard. 107
bailout the
the FDIC assumed eighty percent
percent
In that bailout
about
of Continental Illinois
Illinois Corporation
(CIC), Continental
Continental Illinois's
Illinois's
control of
Corporation (CIC),
control
publicly traded holding
holding company. Its story is worth
worth recounting
recounting in some
publicly
detail as it provides the closest
closest parallel
parallel to the current
current government
government
detail
interventions.
March 31,
1984, Continental
over $40 billion in
in assets
In March
Continental Illinois had over
31, 1984,
seventh largest bank
bank in the United States in both
both assets and
and was the seventh
08
deposits.
Unfortunately, it achieved
achieved this growth through an aggressive
Unfortunately,
deposits.'108
1982-1984
caused the bank's
bank's downfall;
downfall; from 1982-1984
lending policy
policy that ultimately
ultimately caused
assets had significantly
significantly increased,
increased, and the
non-performing assets
the bank's non-performing
holding company's stock price tumbled. In May 1984, rumors
rumors of the
bank's imminent failure led to a run on the bank, and the FDIC intervened
intervened
assisted
with interim assistance. When
When the FDIC's attempts
attempts to arrange
arrange an assisted
acquisition of the bank
bank with private institutions and investors proved
proved
acquisition
09 it worked
worked out, in July
July 1984, a permanent
permanent solution to
unsuccessful,109
unsuccessful,'
0
bank.IID
address the potential deposit run that faced the bank."
According to the head of the FDIC at the time, there were two key
According
components of the program:
program: "top management
"substantial
changes" and "substantial
management changes"
components
aid.,,111 With respect to the second component, the FDIC took a
financial aid.""'
non-performing
These included the removal
removal of non-performing
number of actions.
2
'''troubled loans'"
bankl12 and the implementation
of provisions
provisions to
implementation of
loans' from the bank"l
"'troubled
provide funding for its banking operations and to increase its capital

The phrase
phrase referred
to differential
differential treatment
banks depending
The
referred to
treatment of
of banks
depending on their size
and the resulting perceptions
perceptions of inequity. Lee Davison, Continental
Illinois and
ContinentalIllinois
Fail, " in 1 HISTORY
THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS
EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR
"Too Big To Fail,
HISTORY OF
OF THE
FOR THE
THE FUTURE
FUTURE 235,
(1997).
236 (1997).
107 Inquiries
into Continental
107
Inquiries into
ContinentalIllinois
Illinois Corporation
Corporationand
and Continental
ContinentalIllinois
Illinois National
National
Bank: Hearings
Regulation and
Inst. Supervision,
Supervision,Regulation
Fin. Inst.
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Fin.
Cong. 382 (1984)
UrbanAffairs, 98th Congo
Banking, Fin.
(1984)
Ins. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Fin. and Urban
Ins.
[hereinafter
Hearings].
[hereinafter Hearings].
8
\08 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Continental
1o
ContinentalIllinois
IllinoisNational
NationalBank and
and Trust
Trust Co.,
Co., in
1980-1994, at 545, 546
MANAGING
AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994,
MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND
(1998).
(1998).
' 1985 FDIC, ANN.
109
ANN. REp.
REP. 4 (1985).
(1985).
0
110
supra note 108,
108, at 552. The plan was not officially
INS. CORP., supra
FED. DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT INS.
" FED.
implemented
implemented until September 26, 1984, after shareholders of the Continental
of the assistance package.
holding company
company gave the required approval of
"'Hearings, supra
IIIHearings,
supra note 107, at 461.
supranote 109,
109, at 43. FDIC entered into an asset management
112 1985 FDIC, supra
112
supra
contract with the bank to liquidate the portfolio. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra
555.
note 108, at 555.
106

\06
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113 The FDIC purchased
base.1J3
separate issues of
of preferred
preferred stock
stock in
in CIC:
The FDIC purchased two separate
base.
FDIC purchased
purchased a $720
$720 million issue of permanent,
permanent, nonvoting,
first, the FDIC
14
junior preferred
preferred stock.1114
This preferred
preferred stock
stock was convertible
convertible upon a sale
sale
This
junior
to a third party
party into
into 160
160 million shares
shares of
of common
common stock, which
which effectively
effectively
eighty percent
percent of
of the
the common
common stock."
stock. 115
gave the FDIC control
control of eighty
gave
Furthermore,
the
FDIC
purchased
$280
of
adjustablepermanent,
adjustablemillion
of
purchased
Furthermore,
cumulative preferred
preferred stock (11.2
(11.2 million shares)
shares) of
116 The FDIC
of CIC.116
rate, cumulative
non-voting shares
shares to signal
signal that it did not intend
intend to hold these positions
positions
took non-voting
17
of time.'
time.ll7
The FDIC also acquired
acquired a "make
The
significant amount of
for a significant
whole" option that
that gave it the power, after
after five years,
years, to purchase
purchase 100% of
of
whole"
suffered losses
outstanding CIC shares
shares at a nominal price if the FDIC suffered
losses
the outstanding
exceeding $800
$800 million
million under the loan
loan purchase
purchase agreement."'
agreement. 1I8 The FDIC
exceeding
exercised the "make
"make whole"
whole" arrangement
arrangement on October
October 24, 1989 and
exercised
19
purchased from the holding
holding company
company the remaining
remaining 10.1
10.1 million shares.
shares.1119
purchased
The FDIC retained
retained its holdings for almost seven years until Mait
1991,120
May 1991,120
The
holdings.121
when it announced
remaining equity
equity holdings.
I I
announced a public sale of its remaining
when

The FDIC established
established several
several guiding
guiding principles
principles with respect to
corporate governance.
governance. First, as noted
noted above, "top management
management changes"
changes"
corporate
were important, both to strengthen
bank's management
management and to hold
strengthen the bank's
were
accountable
responsible for the bank's disastrous lending
lending policies.
accountable those responsible
required appointment
appointment of a new
new Chief Executive
Executive Officer
Officer
The FDIC not only required
22 it recruited
and a new chairman
chairman of the Board of Directors,'
Directors,122
recruited and selected
selected
23
It also insisted on the removal
removal of those directors who
officers.1123
the new officers.
were on the board during the years the bank adopted its disastrous
were
expansion
order to "send
directors'
"send a message about directors'
expansion policy, in order
responsibilities.,,124
seek
assurances that it did not seek
responsibilities."12 4 Second, the FDIC made assurances
113

113

FED. DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT INS.
INS. CORP.,
CORP., supra
supra note 108,
FED.
108, at 553.

id

114/d.
114
115Id.
116/d.
116 id.

Davison,
supranote 106, at 248 n.44.
Davison, supra
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
CORP., supra
supra note
note 108,
108, at 553.
553. There was also an option that
118 FED. DEPOSIT INS.
the FDIC could exercise
exercise based on smaller losses: "If
"Ifthe FDIC suffered loss under
the loan purchase
purchase agreement, or in the carrying costs and cost of collection, the
FDIC could exercise
exercise its option rights in proportional
proportional amounts according to the
amount of that loss. The purchase price was to be calculated on the basis of one
share of stock for every $20 of the FDIC's stock."
119
supranote 106, at 557.
119 Davison, supra
120 June 1984-May
120 June
1984-May 1991.
1991.
121 1991 FDIC, ANN. REP. 13. The FDIC had
121 1991 FDIC, ANN.
REp. 13. The FDIC had a twenty-six percent equity interest
that it sold at
at that time.
122 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra
122 FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., supra note 108, at 552.
123 IRVINE E. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT:
BAILOUT: AN
AN INSIDER'S
INSIDER'S ACCOUNT
AccoUNT OF BANK
BANK FAILURES
FAILURES AND
AND
123 IRVINE E. SPRAGUE,
RESCUES 200-209 (1986)
management).
(1986) (describing FDIC's selection of new management).
124 Id. at 215.
124/d.
117
117

118
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to "nationalize"
"nationalize" Continental,
Continental, but
but rather
rather sought
sought either
either to
to minimize
mInImiZe' costs
costs
to
the
FDIC
on
associated
with
the
aid
package
or
maximize
return
on
the
FDIC
the
return
maximize
associated with the aid package
25
investment. 125
To this end, while
while the
the FDIC effectively
effectively had
had an eighty
eighty
To
investment.1
percent interest
interest in
in the
the holding
holding company,
company, the stock
stock had
had no
no voting
voting rights
rights
percent
of
while owned
owned by
by FDIC,
FDIC, although
although itit had
had aa veto
veto power
power over
over the
the nomination
nomination of
while
26
any director.1
director. 126
Third, the
the FDIC
FDIC stated
stated repeatedly
repeatedly that
that itit did
did not
not seek
seek to
Third,
any
interfere with
with day-to-day
day-to-day operations,
operations, but
but rather
rather sought
sought only
only to exercise
exercise
interfere
27 in
In
influence in
in limited areas,
areas, such
such as board
board hiring
hiring and proposed
proposed mergers.'
mergers. 127
influence
these ways,
ways, the FDIC sought to exercise
exercise control
control to achieve
achieve the bank's
bank's
these
timely recovery
recovery and
and recover its investment,
investment, but to avoid
avoid direct involvement
involvement
timely
that would
would signal
signal a "nationalized"
"nationalized" bank.
bank. Despite
Despite this
this balancing
balancing act, both
that
community and
and Continental
Continental Illinois expressed
expressed concerns
concerns about
about
the banking community
bank
that
the
perceptions
bank
potential
competitive
disadvantages
because
of
perceptions
because
potential competitive disadvantages
2
was a "nationalized"
"nationalized" bank.
bank.128'
was
29
Ultimately, the bailout
bailout cost the FDIC approximately
$i.l billion.'
billion.129
It
approximately $1.1
Ultimately,
also established
established principles
principles that were applicable in the 2008-2009
2008-2009
interventions.
interventions.

B. AIG

principally related to credit
credit
AIG suffered about $22 billion in losses principally
insolvent in
technically insolvent.in
mortgage-related assets and was technically
default swaps on mortgage-related
Treasury
transactions, Treasury
complicated transactions,
September 2008.130
2008. 130 Through a series of complicated
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FedNY) provided financial
and the Federal
billion.13I As a result of the financing,
assistance to AIG in excess of $180
assistance
$180 billion.131
preferred shares
Treasury owns, through a Trust established
established for its benefit, preferred
shares
AIG missed
power.13 2 In addition, because AlG
that have 79.77% of the voting power.132
preferred shares owned by
four quarterly dividends on two other classes of preferred
Treasury, Treasury exercised its right in April 2010 to appoint two

Hearings,supra
supra note
note 107,
107, at
at 465.
465. After
After the
the fact,
fact, the
the head
head of
of the FDIC at the
Hearings,
time described
"nationalization." William M. Isaac, Bank
described the bailout as "nationalization."
Al 3.
Nationalization
24, 2009, at Al3.
Answer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,2009,
Isn't the Answer,
NationalizationIsn't
126 Hearings,supra note 107, at 461; FED.
supranote 108,
108, at
126 Hearings, supra
note 107, at 461; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra
550.
127 Hearings,supra note 107, at 461. In the less
and unofficial account,
127 Hearings, supra
note 107, at 461.
the less formal and
however, Sprague
Sprague makes it clear that the FDIC would not allow the
the bank
bank to
to fail,
SPRAGUE,
123, at 206.
supranote 123,
SPRAGUE, supra
128 Davison, supra
supra note
note 106,
106, at 556-57.
128 Davison,
129Id
at 558.
29
Id.
558.
30
o Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Quarterly
Quarterly Report
Report (Form
(Form 10-Q)
10-Q) (Nov. 10,
10, 2008).
130 Am. In1'l Group, Inc.,
131
131 See
See William
William K.
K. Sjostrom,
Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout,
Bailout,66 WASH.
WASH. &
& LEE
LEE L.
L. REv.
REv. 943
943
(2009)
bailout).
the government
government bailout).
terms of the
(2009) (setting
(setting forth the terms
(Apr.
(Schedule 14A),
14A), at 10
10 (Apr.
Statement (Schedule
Int'l Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement
132 Am.
Am. In1'l
132
Apr. 2010].
12,
Statement Apr.
Proxy Statement
AIG, Proxy
[hereinafter AIG,
12, 201O)
2010) [hereinafter
125

125
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133
additional directors.133
Thus, the Trust controls AIG, and, as stated in the
AIG proxy statement,
statement, "the
interests of the Trust and the U.S.
"the interests
U.S. Treasury may
34
not be the same as the interests of AIG's other shareholders."l
shareholders.,,134

Following the Continental Illinois policy of "top
management
"top management
changes," the government
condition of the September 22,
changes,"
government insisted, as a condition
2008 financing, on the resignation of CEO Robert Willumstad (who had
Edward Liddy, formerly
formerly
been CEO for less than four months) and selected Edward
135
3
Board.'1
Chairman of the Board.
Mr. Liddy
CEO at AllState, as the new CEO and Chairman
service" and
came out of retirement
retirement to accept the position
position as a "public service"
came
36
received a nominal $1
salary.136 There
There was also considerable
$1 per year salary.1
received
directors from September 2008 through May 2009.
turnover on the board of directors
Besides Mr. Willumstad, seven AIG directors resigned or announced
announced they
they
Besides
3
reelection. 137
' At the first annual meeting at which the
would not run for reelection.'
government was a controlling shareholder, held on June 30, 2009, the board
directors nominated, and the shareholders
independent
shareholders elected, six independent
of directors
the
June
12,2010
annual
meeting,
there
were
only
three (out
directors. By
By
12, 2010
of eleven) directors up for election
election by the common shareholders
shareholders whose
whose
tenures predated
predated the bailout.
elected by the
The board of directors
directors nominated
nominated all the directors elected
shareholders
annual meeting. While we do not know the extent
shareholders at the 2010 annual
of the government's
government's influence
influence on the selection
selection of the nominees, the
Trustees who vote the government
government shares testified before Congress in May
38
directors'l38
2009 that they were actively recruiting new directors
and had
'11 Am. Int'l Group, Inc. (Form 8-K) (Apr. 1,2010).
133
1, 2010).
134 AIG, Proxy Statement
134
Statement Apr. 2010, supra
supra note 132,
132, at 10.
135
Hearing Before the H.
H Comm. on
'35 AIG: Where
Where is the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?:
Going?: Hearing
[hereinafter AIG: Where is
15-22 (2009) [hereinafter
Oversight
th Cong.
Congo 15-22
111th
and Gov
Gov't't Reform, 111
Oversightand

GOing?] (statement
(statement of Edward Liddy, Chairman
Chief
the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?]
Chairman and Chief
International Group).
Executive
American International
Executive Officer, American
136
Drafted to Run A.I.
A.l.G.,
Down,
136 Mary Williams Walsh, Leave Executive Drafted
G., Will Step Down,
22,2009,
B 1 (Mr. Liddy announced his resignation on May
2009, at B1
N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
21,2009,
"too big and complex"
complex" for one person and that the
21, 2009, stating that the job was "too
government would not find anyone else to take the position at
company and federal government
Robert Benmosche,
Benmosche, a former
a nominal salary). The board of directors selected Robert
al., AIG Selects ExCEO at MetLife, as the CEO in August 2009. Liam Pleven et aI.,
Chief
C1.
Chiefof MetLife as CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at Cl.
'3
Langhammer (Oct. 28, 2009),
137 Fred Langhammer
2009), Edmund Tse (Mar. 25,
25, 2009),
2009), Virginia
Rometty and Michael Sutton (May 7,2009),
Bollenbach, Martin
Martin Feldstein
Feldstein
7, 2009), Stephen Bollenbach,
and James Orr (May
(May 21,2009).
Dammerman) resigned
21, 2009). Another director (Dennis Dammerman)
Feb. 28, 2010.
38
AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?,
138
Going?, supra
supra note 135, at 75-85
(statement of the Trustees ofthe
AlG Credit Facility
Facility Trust: Hearing on the'
the
of the AIG
Oversight and Gov't
Collapse and Federal
Federal Rescue
Rescue of AlG
Gov't
AIG Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
Reform); see also Am. Int'!
Mission Statement
Trustees ofthe
Statement of the Trustees
Int'l Group, Inc., Mission
TRUSTEES 2,
ABOUT THE AlG
AIG TRUSTEES
Credit Facility
INFORMATION ABOUT
FacilityTrust,
Trust, INFORMATION
AIG Credit
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39
recommended five nominees
nominees to the board.1
board. 139
addition, we can
can make
make the
In addition,
recommended
logical assumption
assumption that AIG
AIG would
would not
not nominate
nominate any director
director who
who did not
not
logical
government approval. Accordingly,
Accordingly, looking at the
have at least tacit government
directors who
who assumed
assumed office
office after September
September 2008
2008 gives
gives us a sense
sense of the
directors
characteristics the government
government looks for in directors.
directors. Besides
Besides CEO Robert
characteristics
Benmosche, there
there are
are seven
seven directors
directors elected
elected by the shareholders
shareholders at the
Benmosche,
2010 shareholders
meeting who joined
joined the board
board after September
September 2008.
2008. Six
Six
2010
shareholders meeting
seven directors
directors are men; the
the median age is sixty-four. Six are
of these seven
senior
or other senior management;
management; one
one is currently
currently senior
retired CEOs or
management. The
The median service
service on other boards
boards is two. The principal
principal
management.
areas of expertise
expertise identified
identified by
by the board were:
were: restructuring (five times);
areas
(five times);
times); managing
managing large,
large, complex, international
international institutions
institutions
finance (five
industry
(four
(four
times);
and
professional
experience
in
financial
services
(four
professional experience
(four
aircraft
accounting, risk management, and experience
experience in airline and aircraft
times); accounting,
40
industries were also identified.1
identified. 140
The two directors who were appointed
appointed by
by
The
industries
Treasury directly
directli14411 fit the same
same profile; both are male retired CEOs
CEOs of
of
Treasury
42
approximately the same age.1
age. 142
In short, the new AIG directors
directors are a very
approximately
homogeneous group who
who fit the template
template of the independent
independent director
director in a
homogeneous
cohort of retired
predominately white, male cohort
publicly traded corporation:
corporation: a predominately
CEOs who also serve
serve on several
several other
other corporate
corporate boards.

AIG is the only government
government investment in which the shares were placed
placed
in a Trust. FedNY, which provided the initial federal assistance to AIG, set
set
up the Trust and appointed the initial three Trustees, two of whom have
143 The Trust Agreement
Agreement states that
significant connections
connections with FedNY. 143
arrangement was chosen "to avoid any possible conflict
conflict with FedNY's
FedNY's
this arrangement

http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/aigweb/intemetienifilesiMission%20Stateme
http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/aigweb/intemet/en/files/Mission%20Stateme
5, 2010) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Mission Statement
nt_tcmI121-242395.pdf(last
nt_tcml 121-242395.pdf (last visited May 5,2010)
of the Trusstees]
Trusstees] (the Trustees'
Trustees' Mission
Mission Statement
Statement identifies as their primary initial
focus "to ensure that AIG has a capable and effective board of directors.").
39
1139
Taxpayer's Money Going?,
Going?, supra
supra note 135,
135, at 119 (statement
AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's
of
Douglas
L.
Foshee).
140 AIG, Proxy Statement
Statement Apr.
2010, supra
supra note 132.
140 AIG, Proxy
Apr. 2010,
141 The Treasury was able to appoint these two directors directly because
of its
141 The Treasury was able to appoint these two directors directly
ownership of two other series of preferred shares.
142 These two directors have less service on other boards (one and zero).
142
143 Jill M. Considine is the former Chairman, the Depository Trust &
& Clearing
Clearing
143
Corporation
Corporation and a former member of the New York Fed Board of Directors.
Chester B. Feldberg is the former Chairman, BarcJays
Barclays Americas and was
previously employed by the New York Fed for thirty-six years. Douglas L.
L. Foshee,
Foshee,
who resigned in February 2010, is the President and CEO ofEI
Corporation
of El Paso Corporation
of the Federal Reserve
and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Houston Branch of
Langerman, Chairman, President
Bank of
of Dallas. Foshee was replaced by Peter A. Langerman,
Biographies,
and CEO of the Mutual Series fund group of Franklin Templeton. See Biographies,
Information
(Mar. 3,
3, 2010),
GROUP, INC. (Mar.
Trustees, AM. INT'L
INT'L GROUP,
about the AIG Trustees,
Informationabout
http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.comlBios_1121_239155.html.
http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/Bios1 121_239155.html.
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supervisory and
and monetary
monetary policy functions."'"
functions.,,'44 In
In addition,
addition, use
use of the Trust
Trust
supervisory
may
have
been
viewed
as
a
way
to
deal
with
conflicts
resulting
the
from
conflicts resulting
deal
may have been viewed as
government's dual
dual roles
roles as both a lender
lender and
and shareholder
shareholder or to
to minimize
government's
of the Trust may be
be
political meddling
meddling in corporate
corporate affairs.
affairs. Finally, the use
use of
political
of
an effort to distance
distance the government
government from AIG
AIG governance
governance because
because of
aversion to "nationalizing"
"nationalizing" a private
private business.
business.14'451
The Trustees have
have two
two principal responsibilities:
responsibilities: to improve
improve corporate
corporate
47
46
governance
of the stock.
While the Trust Agreement
Agreement
stock.1147
and to dispose of
governancell46
purports to give the
the Trustees
Trustees broad
broad discretion,
discretion, their
their actual
actual powers
powers have
purports
48
Trust Agreement
Agreement prohibits
significant limitations.1
limitations. '48
Most pertinently, the Trust
significant
49
Moreover, the Trust
Trust
the Trustees
Trustees from becoming
becoming AIG
AIG directors.1
directors. 149
Moreover,
It states that "in
exercising
Agreement
direction to the Trustees. It
"in exercising
Agreement provides direction
FedNY's view"
view"
their discretion
discretion ...
. . . the Trustees are advised that it is the FedNY's
maximizing the company's
company's ability to repay the government
that (1) maximizing
(2)
government and (2)
being managed
managed in a manner that will not disrupt
disrupt financial market conditions
being
are consistent with maximizing
maximizing share
share value. 5150o With respect to the
disposition of the shares, the Trustees are required to develop a divestiture
shares "in
"in a value maximizing
maximizing
plan with the goal of disposing of the shares
manner.,,151
dispose of the shares
shares rests with the
manner."'' Ultimately, the decision to dispose
prior
government, since any disposition
disposition of the shares is subject to the prior
government,
52
approval ofFedNY,
consultation with Treasury.1
Treasury. 152
of FedNY, after its consultation
approval

To date, the Trustees have sought to keep a low profile and have
resisted attempts
attempts to engage
engage them in the public debate and controversy
controversy over
AIG. The Trustees testified
testified at a congressional
congressional hearing in spring 2009 (one
53 and acknowledged
role)'53
acknowledged that
of their few public statements about their role)1
54
"uncharted waters.,,154
They identified their first
waters."'
they were operating in "uncharted
priority as enhancing
enhancing corporate governance
governance to restore public confidence
confidence in

144
14

AM.
GROUP, INC., AIG CREDIT FACILITY
AGREEMENT 2 (2009).
FACLrrY TRUST AGREEMENT
AM. INT'L GROUP,

145Id.
145 id

146 The
purchase agreement
obligates AIG
AIG and
and its
its board
board of directors to "work in
The purchase
agreement obligates
in

146

good faith with the Trustees to ensure corporate
arrangements
governance arrangements
corporate governance
satisfactory to the Trustees."
Trustees." Am. Int'l Group, Inc., (Form 8-K) (Mar. 5,
5, 2009).
satisfactory
147 AM. INT'L GROUP, INC.,
supra note 144, § 2.05.
INC., supra
14 8 Id. at 2.
2. Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustees have "absolute
"absolute discretion and
148Id.
control" over the shares, subject to its terms.
control"
149
supranote 144, §§ 2.04(f). In addition, the Trustees may
149 AM. INT'L GROUP, INC., supra
director
not vote to elect any director who has been, within the past year, an officer, director
Id. §§ 2.04(e).
of FedNY or Treasury. Id.
or senior employee ofFedNY
150Id.
"sId. §§2.04(d).
151
'' !d.
Id. §§ 2.05(a)(ii).
2.05(a)(ii).
152 Id. §
152Id.
§ 2.05(a)(iii).
2.05(a)(iii).
153 AIG: Where
Where is
is the
the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?,
153
Going?, supra
supranote 135.
135.
154Id.
154 Id at 75.
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l55
company and, to this end,
end, they were
were actively
actively recruiting
recruiting new
new directors
directors 55
the company
5156
6
They
and had
had recommended
recommended five nominees
nominees to
to the
the board.'
board.
They requested
requested thenand
CEO Liddy to undertake
undertake a review and
and develop
develop a comprehensive
comprehensive
57
policy.157
They
reviewed
the
adequacy
of
financial and
compensation
adequacy
They
compensation policy.'
l58
58
accounting controls
controls and
and the financial
financial reporting process'
process and
and engaged
engaged in
in
accounting
working sessions with AIG
AIG management,
management, FedNY
FedNY and Treasury
the
Treasury on the
working
59
They emphasized
emphasized they were a "staff
"staff of
of
company's business plan.1
plan. 159
They
company's
60
three,,,I60 and
and because
because of the government's
government's monitoring
monitoring of AIG, they
three,"1
believed it was not cost-effective
cost-effective for them to hire
hire staff or consultants
consultants to
believed
6
assist them in their efforts.1
efforts. 161' They
They testified
testified that it was premature
premature to
assist
develop a plan
plan for disposition
disposition of the
the shares;
shares; when that eventuality
~ventuality became
became
develop
62
they would
would engage
engage experts
experts to assist with
with the process.1
process. 162
When
When
imminent, they
Congressional members
members asked about
about their views on the business
business plan, the
Congressional
6
job.,,163
Trustees' response was a polite,
polite, but firm "not
"not our job."
Indeed, some
Trustees'
Committee members expressed
expressed frustration and
and confusion
confusion over the Trustees'
Trustees'
l64
Towns asking them what was their role.
role.16
activities, with Chairman Towns
Other attempts
attempts to involve the Trustees in public
public debate over
over AIG have
Other
failed. An activist shareholder
urged
their
support
for
its shareholder
shareholder
support
shareholder
Trustees supported
supported management
management
executive compensation;
compensation; the Trustees
resolution on executive
5 Eliot Spitzer, the former Governor
Governor of
of
against the resolution.16165
and voted against
New York who has become
become something
something of a corporate
corporate gadfly,166
gadfly,166 urged the
New
non-privileged
board of directors
directors to disclose non-privileged
Trustees to put pressure on the board
67
AIG emails to permit an "open
the Trustees did not
investigation;'167
"open source" investigation;
publicly respond.
maintained a low profile, the involvement
involvement
Although the Trustees have maintained
government in its roles as creditor and regulator
regulator has been more intrusive
of government
1ss Id.
ISS
!d. at 118. Similarly, the Trustees'
Trustees' Mission Statement
Statement identifies
identifies as their primary
directors."
initial focus "to ensure that AIG has a capable
capable and effective board of directors."
supra note 138.
Am. Int'l Group, Inc., supra
156 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?,
156
GOing?, supra
119 (statement
(statement
supranote 135, at 119
of Douglas L. Foshee).
5
157Id.
at 83. Although they requested him to report back to them regularly, II have
1 7Id.
not found any follow-up on this.
5 d. at 84.
158
.
1Id.
I
15soid.
159Id.
160 Id. at 135.
160Id.
161 Id.
161Id.
162Id.
162 id
163 Id.
Id. at 134-36.
163
164
!d. at 134 ("What is your role in trying to turn this around?").
'6Id.
165 Am. Int'l
Inc., Quarterly
Quarterly Report
Report (Form
(Form 10-Q) (Aug. 7,2009).
7, 2009).
165 Am. Int'l Group,
Group, Inc.,
166 See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, The Incentives Catastrophe,SLATE,
166 See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, The Incentives Catastrophe,
June 23, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/idl2257955.
http://www.slate.com/id/2257955.
167 Eliot Spitzer, Frank Partnoy &
167 Eliot Spitzer, Frank
Partnoy & William Black, Op-Ed., Show Us the
the E-Mail,
E-Mail,
N.Y.
N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at WK9.
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and, in some instances, the source of considerable tension for AIG
of
management. In its role as creditor, FedNY maintains
maintains on-site monitoring of
AIG; according to the AIG website, "[a]s
"[a]s creditor, the FRBNY monitors the
divestiture plan and participates
participates
implementation of AIG's restructuring and divestiture
implementation
observer in the corporate governance
governance of AIG.,,168
AIG."'6 8 Because AIG
as an observer
received "exceptional
"exceptional assistance" under TARP, AIG is subject to special
received
conditions
regarding executive compensation, company
company expenses
expenses and
conditions regarding
69
lobbying, for which Treasury
Treasury has responsibility to monitor compliance. 169
lobbying,
Special Master
Master must approve
approve compensation
compensation payments to
In addition, the Special
70
employees.ol7O
The
AIG's top five SEOs and twenty next highly paid employees.
Special Master's determinations
determinations on AIG executive compensation
compensation so upset
appointed CEO Robert
Robert Benmosche
Benmosche in November
November 2009 that he
the newly appointed
AIG Chairman Harvey
threatened
even
starting,17l
and
Harvey
starting,171
before
to
resign
threatened
determinations as making
Golub criticized
criticized some of the Special Master's determinations
Golub
"little business sense.,,172
sense." 72
"little
In addition, critics have questioned the motives behind some of the
73
Perhaps the most controversial instance
government's
actions. 173
Perhaps
government's regulatory actions.'
were allegations that FedNY
FedNY reviewed
reviewed and edited AIG's SEC filings to
cover up details of some transactions,
political fallout from the fact
transactions, to avoid political
that FedNY paid AIG counterparties
counterparties (including Goldman Sachs) full value
74
to terminate their credit
credit default swaps.1
swaps.174
FedNY insisted that its actions
FedNY
Government Investment,
AM. INT'L
INT'L GROUP,
www.aigcorporate.com/
Government
Investment, AM.
GROUP, INC.,
INC., www.aigcorporate.com/
GlinAIG/role_trustees.html
21, 2010).
GlinAIG/role trustees.html (last visited Sept. 21,
169 See OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN.
GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
169 See OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL
SPECIAL INSPECTOR
PROGRAM,
MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH T
ARP REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENTS
TARP
PROGRAM, TREASURY'S MONITORING
ASSISTANCE, SIGTARP
10-007, at 5-9 (July
(July
SIGTARP 10-007,
RECEIVING SPECIAL ASSISTANCE,
BY COMPANIES RECENING
29,2010)
(criticizing compliance
implementation as too slow, overly reliant on the
2010) (criticizing
compliance implementation
29,
companies to self-report
inadequately staffed).
self-report and inadequately
companies
170 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT
CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra
REPORT TO CONGRESS
supranote 62, at
102-05.
102-05.
171 Anastasia Kelly, AIG's General Counsel, did resign
resign because of Mr. Feinberg's
Feinberg'S
reduction of her base salary. Carol Loomis,
Loomis, Inside
CNNMONEY,
Inside the Crisis
Crisis at AIG, CNNMONEY,
reduction
Inews/companies/aig_bailout_
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/17/news/companies/aigbailout_
Feb. 18, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/17
kelly.fortune/index.htm?postversion=20 10021815.
kelly.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2010021815.
172 Press Release, Harvey Golub, Chairman, Am. Int'l Group, Inc.,
Inc., Chairman's
Chairman's
Message (Feb. 26,2010),
http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/
Message
26, 2010), available
availableat http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/
AIG09AR-Chairman.pdf.
AIGO9AR-Chairman.pdf.
173
' See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM,
FEDERAL AGENCIES'
OVERSIGHT OF AIG COMPENSATION
PROGRAM, EXTENT OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES' OVERSIGHT
COMPENSATION
VARIED, AND
REMAIN, at 16 (Oct. 14,2009).
Treasury
VARIED,
AND IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT CHALLENGES
CHALLENGES REMAIN,
14, 2009). Treasury
also received
received considerable
considerable criticism for not taking action to prevent the payment of
of
bonuses, in March
March 2009, to AIG employees,
employees, although the payments were not
prohibited
eohibited under EESA
EESA and ARRA.
74
174
See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
RELIEF
PROGRAM,
FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT
LIMIT PAYMENTS
TO AIG
AIG
PAYMENTS TO
PROGRAM, FACTORS
COUNTERPARTIES
Oversight & Government
Government Reform
COUNTERPARTIES (Nov. 17,2009).
17, 2009). The House Oversight
168

168
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17 5
were taken to protect the taxpayers'
Whether or not there is
taxpayers' investment. 175
any truth to these allegations,
controversy illustrates the suspicion
suspicion that
allegations, the controversy
surrounds governmental
governmental involvement in private business and illustrates the
need for greater transparency.

If we compare the Continental Illinois guiding principles
principles with the
government's
government's actions in AIG, the significant
significant difference
difference is that in the former
case the shares held by the FDIC had no voting power, while the AIG
shares have voting power-although
power-although the government
chose not to exercise
government chose
shares
Agreement suggests that, at least at
the votes directly. The use of the Trust Agreement
uncomfortable in its role
the time of the AIG bailout, the government was uncomfortable
as shareholder. In other respects, the principles remain the same: replace
policy on
on
"hands-off' policy
the CEO and some of the directors and assert a "hands-off'
operational decisions while exerting considerable
control behind
behind the scenes.
considerable control
operational
C. Citigroup
Citigroup

of
Citigroup became
became a financial super-firm
super-firm through the 1998
1998 merger of
Citicorp and Travelers Group Inc.,
Inc., a combination that brought about the
previously
repeal of the Glass-Steagall
1933, the law that had previously
repeal
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,
76
separated commercial and investment
investment banking.
Ten years later,
banking.'176
devastated as a result of its aggressive
aggressive activity
activity in
Citigroup was financially devastated
77
expended fortymarket.1177
In fall 2008, Treasury expended
the securitized
securitized mortgage market.
Citigroup in the form of preferred
five billion dollars in TARP
TARP funding to Citigroup
preferred
7
In July 2009,
2009, at the request of Citigroup, the
shares and warrants.1
warrants. 178
1
stock
government converted
converted a portion of its preferred shares into common stock
Reserve stress test found that Citigroup
Citigroup needed
needed
because the Federal Reserve
Committee held a hearing addressing
addressing this issue on January 27,
27,2010.
Federal
2010. The Federal
AIG: Hearing
Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight
Oversightand Gov't Reform,
ofAIG:
H. Comm.
Bailout of
Illth
Congo (2010)
(2010) (statements
Treasury
U.S. Treasury
(statements of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S.
111th Cong.
Executive Vice President
President and General Counsel,
Deparment &
C. Baxter, Executive
& Thomas C.
Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
Federal Reserve
N.Y.).
'7s
FactorsAffecting
Counterparties:Hearing
175 Factors
Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG
AIG Counterparties:
Hearing
Before the H.
Oversight and Gov
Gov't
Cong. 13 (2010)
H. Comm. on Oversight
't Reform, 111th
III th Congo
of
(statement of Thomas C.
C.Baxter, Executive
Executive Vice President and General Counsel of
(statement
the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
176
Street Rules May Fall
176 See Robert
Robert Schmidt
Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, Wall Street
FallShort of
of
Glass-Steagall, Bus. WK.,
WK., May 26,
26,2010,
http://www.businessweek.comlnews/
2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/
Glass-Steagall,
-.html.
201
0-05-26/wall-street-rules-may-fall-short-of-glass-steagall-update 1
I-.html.
2010-05-26/wall-street-rules-may-fall-short-of-glass-steagall-update
177 See Bradley
J. Moore
& Jesse Westbrook, Citi's
Citi's Prince
177
Bradley Keoun, Michael
Michael J.
Moore &
Prince Says
No One Saw CDO
CDO Losses Coming,
Coming, BLOOMBERG,
BLOOMBERG, April 8, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.comlnewsI20
10-04-081citi-s-prince-says-no-one-saw-cdohttp://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2010-04-08/citi-s-prince-says-no-one-saw-cdolosses-coming.html.
losses-coming.html.
approximately
178 The government
government also agreed to share losses on a portfolio of approximately
$301 billion ofCitigroup
of Citigroup assets. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Written
$301
Testimony of Assistant Secretary
before the Congressional Oversight Panel
Secretary Allison before
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg573.htrn.
(March
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg573.htm.
4, 2010), available
(March 4,2010),
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additional capital. As a result, the government obtained
obtained a 33.6% common
common
179
In December
2009,
Citigroup
repurchased
the
balance
stock interest. 179
December
balance of
of
owned by the government in order to exit from the
the preferred
preferred shares owned
80
"exceptional assistance"
assistance" program. 180
conclude its
"exceptional
The government wants to conclude
equity investment in 2010 and has begun to sell off its common stock,
181 Currently it has reduced its ownership
subject to market conditions.181
ownership
position to approximately
approximately eighteen percent
percent of the common stock.
In contrast to the trust arrangement
arrangement for the AIG shares, Treasury
Treasury owns
the Citigroup securities directly. It has full discretion to vote the shares for
transactions and
the election
election or removal of directors, approval of major transactions
share issuances, and amendments
amendments to the certificate
certificate of incorporation
incorporation and
bylaws. On all other matters,
matters, it agrees to vote in the same proportion
proportion as the
82
other shares.1
shares. 182

In contrast to the other bailouts, the government did not require the
Prince, the CEO who
removal of the CEO, probably because Charles Prince,
83 had
famously stated in summer
summer 2007 that the bank
bank "was
"was still dancing,"'
dancing,,,183
84
84
already resigned
resigned in November
November 2007 because
because of
ofCitigroup's
Citigroup's losses.1 While
there were frequent reports
reports that the government
government would require the
resignation of Mr. Prince's successor, Vikram Pandit, in connection
connection with
the July 2009 transaction, he remains CEO as of
ofmid-2010.185
mid-2010. 85
There has been considerable turnover on the Citigroup board since the
government bailout, including the retirements
retirements of two directors associated
associated
86
Chairman,186
Win
with the Prince era: Robert
Robert Rubin, who served as Chairman,1
and Sir Win
187
Bischoff, who served
served as acting CEO, after Mr. Prince's resignation.
resignation.'
The
extent to which these resignations were driven by the government
government is
impossible to know, but according
according to published reports, the government
government put
179 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
RELIEF
1'
PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REpORT
CONGRESS at 68 (Oct. 21, 2009); see also
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY
REPORT To CONGRESS
also
Citigroup, Inc.,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at pt.3.02 (June 10,2009).
10, 2009).
180 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010,
supra
180 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REpORT TO CONGRESS Jan.
supra note 62, at 74.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra
13.
181 Press Release, U.S.
supranote 13.
182 Citigroup, Inc., supra note
182 Citigroup, Inc., supra
179.
183 See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup ChiefStays
183 See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on
TIMES, July 10,2007,
Buy-Outs, FIN. TIMES,
10, 2007, at 1.
184
184 In the Citigroup press release, Mr. Prince
Prince stated, "it is my judgment that given
given
mortgage-backed securities business, the only
only
the size of the recent losses in our mortgage-backed
down." Press
Press
honorable course
course for me to take as Chief Executive Officer is to step down."
E. Rubin to serve as chairman
Release, Citigroup, Inc., Robert E.
chairman ofthe
of the Board ofCiti;
of Citi;
(Nov. 4, 2007), available
available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.
jsp?ndmViewld-news
jsp?ndm
ViewId=news_view&newsld=20071104005057&newsLang-en.
view&newsId=200711 04005057 &newsLang=en.
185 See Eric Dash, Citi
Citi is Urged
Urged to Replace
Replace its Chairman,
Chairman,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
12,
BI (reporting that Mr. Pankit has Timothy Geithner's
Geithner's support).
2009, at B1
186
Citigroup, Inc.,
Inc., Current
Current Report
186 Citigroup,
Report (Form
(Form 8-K) (Jan. 9, 2009).
187 Id.; see
Dash,supra
187 /d.; see also
also Dash,
supra note 185.
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considerable pressure
pressure on
on Citigroup
Citigroup to
to shake
shake up
up its board
board of
of directors,
directors, to
considerable
188
188
Since the
the government
government bailout,
bailout, the board
board of
of directors
directors
signify aa fresh
fresh start.
Since
signify
has nominated,
nominated, and
and the
the shareholders
shareholders elected,
elected, eight
eight new
new independent
independent
has
89
The personal
personal and
and professional
professional characteristics
characteristics of
of this
this cohort
cohort are
directors. 189
The
directors.1
age
median
the
men;
very
similar
to
those
of
the
AIG
directors:
seven
are
median
age is
are
seven
directors:
very similar to those of the
management,
are retired
retired CEOs,
CEOs, two
two are
are current
current CEOs
CEOs or senior
senior management, one
one
63; four are
90 The
an academic,
academic, and
and one isis the
the former President
President of Mexico.1
Mexico. 190
The median
median
is an
number of other
other boards
boards on which
which they serve is two.
number
In addition
addition to its voting
voting power,
power, Treasury
Treasury exercises
exercises oversight
oversight through
through its
In
of Citigroup's
Citigroup's financial condition.
condition. Thus,
Thus, Citigroup
Citigroup agreed to
monitoring of
monitoring
provide Treasury
Treasury with access
access to corporate
corporate books and
and financial
financial and
and
provide
accounting records
records until government
government ownership
ownership drops
drops below a specified
specified
accounting
percentage. 19
1911 Treasury
Treasury monitors
monitors Citigroup's
Citigroup's liquidity, capital, profits
profits and
and
percentage.
losses, loss reserves and credit ratings, and hired an outside asset
92
government
management firm to monitor
monitor its investment.1
investment. '92
Finally, the government
management
asserts considerable
considerable influence
influence over
over the company
in its multiple roles
roles as
company in
asserts
regulator of the bank
bank and
and other
other financial services firms that comprise
comprise
regulator
Citigroup; the press has frequently reported on the conflicting
conflicting messages and
Citigroup;
the multiple
from
resulting
confusion
within
company
resulting
multiple federal
resulting
the
confusion
resulting
93
regulators.
193
regulators.1

compare the Continental Illinois/AIG
Illinois/AIG guiding principles,
principles,' the
If we compare
2009, Treasury directly owns voting
significant difference
difference is that, as of July 2009,
shares. This was, as I discuss next, approximately the same time that
Treasury acquired its voting shares
shares in the automakers
automakers and suggests that by
this time it had become more comfortable with its role as shareholder.
While the Citigroup CEO was not replaced, the principles
principles otherwise remain
remain
on
the same: replace some of the directors and assert a hands-off policy on
operational
matters
while
exercising
considerable
control
behind
the
scenes.
exercising
operational
D. GM and
Chrysler
and Chrysler

GM and Chrysler are both icons of American industry whose continued
existence was in jeopardy
jeopardy because of decades of poor business decisions
94
crisis.1194
and the slump in consumer spending occasioned by the financial crisis.
Deborah Solomon
Solomon &
& David
David Enrich,
Enrich, U.S.
U.S. to
to Take
Take Big
Big Citi
Citi Stake and
and Overhaui
Overhaul
Deborah
the Board,
C1.
27, 2009, at Cl.
J., Feb. 27,2009,
Board,WALL ST. J.,
189 Citigroup, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement
189 Citigroup,
Inc., Definitive Proxy
(Schedule 14A),
14A), at 22 (Mar. 12,
12,
2010).
188

188

190Id.
190 Id

Citigroup,
3.02.
at Item
Item 3.02.
note 179, at
Inc., supra
supranote
Citigroup, Inc.,
GAO, THE
THE U.S.
U.S. GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENT ROLE
ROLE AS
AS SHAREHOLDER,
SHAREHOLDER, supra
supranote 91, at 16.
16.
GAO,
193 See
See Langley
Langley &
& Enrich, supra
supranote
note 2l.
193
21.
the
by the
194
Remarks by
Sec'y, Remarks
Press Sec'y,
ofthe
the Press
Office of
House, Office
White House,
Release, The White
Press Release,
194 Press
at
President on
availableat
1, 2009), available
Motors Restructuring (June 1,2009),
General Motors
on General
191
19'

192

192
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In December 2008, the administration
administration set up the Automotive Industry
Financing Program under TARP,195
administration
TARP,' 95 and the Obama administration
established an automotive
automotive task force to force the companies
companies to make
submitting restructuring
restructuring plans to the
difficult decisions. 196
196 After twice submitting
government, the automakers
automakers went through a rapid bankruptcy process
process under
under
government
pressure and assurances
assurances of government support. As the press
government pressure
U.S. automaker
file for
frequently noted, Chrysler was the first
fIrst major U.S.
automaker to fIle
197
In June 2009, Chrysler emerged from
from
bankruptcy since 1933.
1933.197
bankruptcy, with Treasury owning 9.85% equity,198
entered an alliance
alliance
equity,198 and entered
with the Italian automaker Fiat. In July 2009, GM emerged
emerged from
bankruptcy, with Treasury owning
owning 60.8% equity and $2.1 billion in
99 Unlike AIG and Citigroup,
preferred shares.'
shares. 199
Citigroup, whose bailouts were driven
impact on the financial
fInancial markets, the government
government bailed out
by fears of the impact
automobile industry as
GM and Chrysler because
because of the importance
importance of the automobile
an employer, particularly
particularly in the industrial Midwest, an area hard hit by the
20 0
Indeed, the government
conditioned its fInancing
on
fInancial crisis.
financial
crisis. 20o
government conditioned
financing on
commitments
vehicles in
commitments from both companies
companies to produce
produce a portion of their vehicles
20
assistance was also conditioned
conditioned on the companies'
the u.S.
U.S. 201
1 Government
Government assistance
companies'
best efforts to reduce total compensation
compensation paid to U.S.
U.S. employees
employees to levels
levels
Toyota at
comparable
compensation paid by Honda, Nissan or Toyota
comparable with total compensation
2 02
U.S. facilities.
facilities?02
their U.S.
Treasury holds its common shares in the automakers
auto makers directly and in
shareholders agreement
agreement with the other shareholders.
each case has entered a shareholders
o3
2010)203
Prior to the GM IPO (which may occur in the latter part of 2010i
http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press_ office/Remarks-by-the-President-onoffice/Remarks-by-the-President-onhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
General-Motors-Restructuring!.
General-Motors-Restructuring/.
U.S. GOV'T
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
PROGRAM:
195 U.S.
CONTINUED
CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP
STEWARDSHIP NEEDED
NEEDED AS TREASURY
TREASURY DEVELOPS STRATEGIES FOR
MONITORING
MONITORING AND
FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN
AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL
INCHRYSLER
CHRYSLER AND
AND GM, GAOGAO10-151,
STEWARDSHIP], available
available
[hereinafter GAO, CONTINUED
CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP],
10-151, at 11 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter
at
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dI0151.pdf.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0151.pdf.
196 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Ron Bloom, Senior Advisor
196
Advisor at
U.S. Treasury Dep't Statement
the U.S.
Statement before the Congo
Cong. Oversight
Oversight Panel Regarding
2009),
Treasury's Automotive
Automotive Industry Financing
Financing Program
Program (AIFP)
(AlFP) (July 27,
27,2009),
available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg236.htm [hereinafter
[hereinafter Press
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg236.htm
available
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury].
Treasury].
19
197 Jim Rutenberg &
Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection,
Protection,
& Bill Vlasic, Chrysler
ChryslerFiles
N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
I, 2009, at Al.
AI.
198 GAO, CONTINUED
CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP,
STEWARDSHIP, supra
195, at 2.
supra note 195,
99 d.
1199
IId.
200 Press
Press Release,
Release, The
House, Office
Office of
the Press
Press Sec'y,
Sec'y, supra
200
The White
White House,
of the
supra note 194.
201
GAO,
CONTINUED
STEWARDSHIP,
supra
note
195,
201 GAO, CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP, supra
195, at 15.
15.
202
202 !d.
Id. at 12.
203 Soyoung Kim & Philipp
GMIPO
203 Soyoung Kim &
Philipp Halstrick,
Halstrick, GM
IPO Filing,
Filing, in Auto Loan Talks:
Sources,
23,2010,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/artic1e/idUSTRE65
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65
Sources, REUTERS, June 23,
M5L220
100624.
M5L220100624.
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04
Treasury can vote its shares
Treasury
shares as it determines. 2204
Thereafter, the
government's
policy with respect to its GM and Chrysler shares
shares is
government's voting policy
essentially the same: it can vote its shares for (1) director removal,
removal, (2)
transactions, (4)
director election as agreed, (3)
(3) change of control transactions,
amendments
certificate of incorporation and bylaws
amendments to the certificate
bylaws that would affect
voting rights, and (5) other matters, solely to the extent its vote is required
required
220s
05
and in the same proportion
proportion as the public shareholders.

percent of common stock,
Finally, so long as Treasury owns at least ten percent
budgets, reports, liquidity
GM must provide all financial statements, budgets,
statements, and other information pursuant
pursuant to the credit agreement,
agreement, as well
statements,
as a monthly report, the format and content
content of which Treasury
Treasury has the right
to specify.206
specify. 206

The CEOs of both companies
announced their resignations
companies announced
resignations during the
negotiations with the administration
administration over the restructurings. It was widely
Richard
press that the administration forced out G. Richard
reported in the press
condition of the restructuring,207
restructuring,207 while
Wagoner, Jr., GM's CEO, as a condition
Robert Nardelli, the Chrysler CEO, stated he made the decision
voluntarily.208
changes at the top. In
In
voluntarily. 208 At GM, there were subsequent changes
December
"Fritz"
Frederick "Fritz"
December 2009, the GM board, in a surprise move, asked Frederick
Henderson, Mr. Wagoner's successor,
successor, to resign, reportedly because
because as a
Henderson,
twenty-five year GM employee, he was not "enough
"enough of a change agent;"
agent;"
09
Treasury stated it was not involved in the decision. 2209
Edward Whitacre
Treasury
succeeded Mr. Henderson, first as interim CEO, then as permanent
permanent CEO in
succeeded
2010.z 1O The administration
administration had selected Mr. Whitacre,
Whitacre, a former
former
January 2010.210
AT&T
AT &T CEO, to be Chairman of the GM board when
when GM emerged
emerged from
2 11
bankruptcy.211
bankruptcy.

204

204

General Motors,
Co., Stockholders
Agreement (Form
(Form 8-K)
8-K) (July 16,2009).
16, 2009).
General
Motors, Co.,
Stockholders Agreement

Id.; see GAO, THE U.S.
U.S. GOvERNMENT
SHAREHOLDER, supra
20S !d.; see GAO, THE
GOVERNMENT ROLE
ROLE AS
AS SHAREHOLDER,
supra note 91,
91,
13.
at 13.
206 General Motors Co., supra note 204, at art. IV §
206 General Motors Co., supra note 204, at art. IV § 5.4; GAO,
GAO, THE U.S.
U.S.
GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER,
supra note 91,
91, at 14.
SHAREHOLDER, supra
GOVERNMENT
207 Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Government Forces Out Wagoner
207 Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Government Forces
Wagoner at GM, WALL
30,2009,
AI.
ST. J., Mar. 30,
2009, at Al.
208 David Welch & David Kiley, ChryslerFiles
for Bankruptcy,
Bankruptcy, Bus. WK.,
208 David Welch & David Kiley, Chrysler Filesfor
WK., Apr. 30,
205

dnflashlcontent!apr2009/db200904 3
2009, http://www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/apr2009/db2009043

02o 84153I.htm.
841531.htm.
(9 Bill Vlasic, G.M Asks Its Chiefto Resign, N.Y. TIMES,
2, 2009, at Bi.
209 Bill Vlasic, G.M
Asks Its Chief to Resign, N.Y. TlMES, Dec. 2,2009,
BI.
210 General Motors, Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 7, 2009).
210 General Motors, Co., Current Report (Form 8-K)
7,2009). Mr. Henderson
stepped down after increased pressure from the Board of Directors. See John D.
D.
Stoll &
& Kate Linebaugh, GM's Chairman
ChairmanSeizes the Wheel,
Wheel, WALL ST. J., Dec.!,
Dec. 1,

2009 at AI.
Al.
211
211 Bill Vlasic, G.M
Share, N.Y. TlMES,
G.M Chairman
Chairman Vows to Defend Market Share,
TIMES, Aug.
Aug. 4,
4,
2009,
2009, at B
BI.
1.
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Pursuant to the GM Shareholders
Shareholders Agreement,
Agreement, Treasury can designate
212
ten of the thirteen directors.212
In the case of the Chrysler
Chrysler board, Treasury
213
can designate four of the nine directors. 213
fourteen
The profile of these fourteen
directors appointed by Treasury
directors
Treasury again fits the profile of the typical
independent
independent director. Eleven of the fourteen directors are men; the median
age is 60. Five are current CEOs or senior management, seven are retired
retired
academics (one of whom is
CEOs or senior management, two are academics
Chancellor
university system). The median
median number of
of
Chancellor of a major state university
14
two.2214
other boards is between one and twO.
While the heavy hand of the government
government was visible in forcing the
companies into bankruptcy, both the President and Treasury reiterated
companies
reiterated the
"reluctant shareholder"
"reluctant
shareholder" policy. President Obama emphasized
emphasized that the
unwelcome position of
financial crisis "[has]
"[has] put our government in the unwelcome
of
companies for the simple and compelling
owning large stakes in private companies
compelling
reason that their survival and the success
success of our overall economy depend on
on
it.,,215 The government
it."215
government stated that it would seek to exit as soon as
practicable, 2 16 planned to manage its interest in a hands-off manner
practicable,z16
manner 217l7 and
18
did not plan to manage its interests to achieve social
social policy goals.2218
Notwithstanding
administration's characterization
characterization of itself as a passive
Notwithstanding the administration's
shareholder,
bailouts show that it will negotiate for
shareholder, the GM and Chrysler bailouts
concerns other than corporate profitability.
conditions driven by concerns
Conditioning the financing on the automakers'
commitment to produce
produce a
automakers' commitment
212 The GM CEO is one of the directors, one is designated by UAW
212
The GM CEO is one ofthe directors, one is designated
UAW Retiree
Retiree
Medical Benefits Trust, and one is designated
designated by Canada Holdings. At least twoMedical
independent under NYSE
thirds of all directors must be independent
NYSE rules. General Motors
Motors Co.,
Co.,
sura
sUfra note 204.
212 Fiat appoints three, the Canadian
Canadian government
W
government appoints one, and the UA
UAW
Merced &
Micheline
Retiree Medical
Medical Benefits Trust appoints one. Michael. J.
J. de la Merced
& Micheline
TIMES, June 11,
Maynard, Fiat
FiatTakes over Chrysler
Chryslerafter
after 42-Day
42-Day Bankruptcy,
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
11,
2009, at B4.
214 See Board
214
Board ofDirectors,
ofDirectors, GENERAL
GENERAL MOTORS
MOTORS CO. (Aug. 10,
10,2010),
2010),
http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/board.jsp (containing
http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/board.jsp
information on GM
(containing information
GM
Board of Directors); see also Press Release, U.S.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury
Treasury
Appointments (July 5,
Department Statement
Chrysler's Board of Director Appointments
Department
Statement on Chrysler's
5,
2009) (listing the appointments
appointments that the Treasury made to the Chrysler Board of
of
Directors), available
available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tgI97.htm; see also
Directors),
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tgl97.htm;
also
Board
ofDirectors, CHRYSLER
CHRYSLER GROUP
GROUP LLC, http://www.media.chrysler.com/bios.
Board ofDirectors,
http://www.media.chrysler.comlbios.
do;jsessionid=59EA2FO95383CD9943E4E9CO96DI776A? (last visited Aug. 10,
do;jsessionid=59EA2F095383CD9943E4E9C096DI776A?
10,
(information on the Board of Directors currently at Chrysler).
2010 (information
215 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press
215 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra
supra note 194.
216 Treasury agreed to use its best efforts to cause an IPO
216 Treasury agreed to use its best efforts to cause an
within one year. See
General
General Motors
Motors Co.,
Co., supra
supranote 204.
217 Press Release,
Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra
supranote 194
194
(stating
doing-what I have no interest
interest in doing-is running
(stating that "what we are not doing-what
GM").
218 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
supra
218 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
supra note 196.
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portion of their vehicles
vehicles in the United States was driven by the desire to
19
U.S. workers. 2219
save jobs for U.S.
This same tension between jobs and
controversy over the closings of dealerships.
profitability resurfaced in the controversy
provides the best
The controversy
controversy over the closing of auto dealerships provides
business policy and politics. The business
business
example of a clash between business
example
strategy of both automakers
automakers required reducing the number of dealerships to
22 0
Auto dealerships, however, have
become leaner and more cost-effective. 220
22
evidence.221
political clout, and it was much in evidence.
1 Although there were no
reports that the .administration
administration interfered in these decisions, individual
Congressional
the·-perceived
perceived
Congressional representatives expressed indignation
indignation at the
222
Senator Jay Rockefeller
unfaimess. 222
unfairness.
Rockefeller (D-W.V.)
(D-W.V.) expressed a typical
sentiment: "Let
"Let me be very clear-I don't believe that companies should be
allowed to take taxpayer funds for a bailout and then leave local dealers and
their customers
customers to fend for themselves
themselves with no real notice and no real help.
2 23
It's just plain wrong."
wrong.,,223
Indeed, as in the case of the Congressional
24 many members of Congress showed a
hearing on the AIG Trustees/
Trustees,224
role. Thus, Senator
Senator Mark Warner
misunderstanding
misunderstanding of the shareholder's role..
Warner
"micro-managing" the companies
(D-Va.) acknowledged
acknowledged the danger of "micro-managing"
companies but
concluded that as government
government owners "we've got the right and
responsibility to ask these questions.,,225
Congress did intervene
questions." 225 In the end, Congress
2226
26
Approximately HOO
and gave terminated dealers a right to arbitration.
Approximately
1100
GM dealers appealed
appealed termination
termination decisions; GM recently
recently announced
announced it
219 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING
PROGRAM,
AFFECTING THE DECISIONS
DECISIONS OF GENERAL
GENERAL MOTORS
MOTORS AND.
AND.
CHRYSLER TO REDUCE
REDUCE THEIR
THEIR DEALERSHIP
DEALERSHIP NETWORKS
available
NETWoRKS 3 (JULY
(JULY 19, 2010), available
at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/201
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/auditl20 10/Factors%2OAffecting%20the%20
0IFactors%20Affecting%20the%20
Decisions%200f/o20General%20Motors%20and%20Chrysler%20to%20Reduce%
Decisions%200fUIo20General%20Motors%20and%20Chrysler%20to%20Reduce%
20TheirtlIo20Dealership%20Networks%207
201O.pdf.
20Their/o20Dealership%20Networks%207 - 19- 2010.pdf.
220 GM announced
announced that it planned to reduce the number of
GM dealers in the U.S.
ofGM
U.S.
from 6000 to approximately 3600. Press Release, General Motors, Co., The New
General Motors Launches Today (July 10, 2009), available
availableat
http://www.buicknaias.comlcontentlmedialus/
en/news/news_detail. brand_gm.htmV
http://www.buicknaias.com/content/medialus/en/news/newsdetail.brandgm.html/
content/Pages/news/us/en/2009/Jul/07 10_NewGMLaunches.
contentlPages/news/us/en/2009/JuV0710
_ NewGMLaunches. The bankruptcy
bankruptcy
judge overseeing
bankruptcy allowed it to terminate
terminate about twenty-five
overseeing the Chrysler bankruptcy
twenty-five
immediately: Judge
Judge Says Chrysler
Chrysler Has
Has Good
percent of its dealer franchises immediately:
Good Case
Case
Cuts, USA
USA TODAY,
5, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/
http://www.usatoday.comlmoney/
for Franchise
FranchiseCuts,
TODAY, June 5,
autos/2009-06-04-chrysler-court _N.htm.
autos/2009-06-04-chrysler-court
N .htm.
221
& Bernie Becker, Auto Dealers
Washington, N.Y.
221 Carl Hulse &
Dealers at Risk Turn to Washington,
TIMES, June 12,2009,
12, 2009, at Bl.
~

id.
Id.
Peter Whoriskey
& Kendra
Dealer
Peter
Whoriskey &
Kendra Marr,
Marr, Senators
Senators Blast Automakers Over Dealer
Closings, WASH. POST, June 4,
Closings,
4,2009,
A15.
2009, at A15.
224 See supra note 164 and accompanying
224 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
225 See Whoriskey & Marr, supra
225 See Whoriskey & Marr, supra note 223.
226 Dana Hedgpeth, GM to Reinstate 600 Dealerships
226 Dana Hedgpeth, GM to Reinstate
Dealerships Slated to Close,
Close, WASH. POST,
222
222
223

223

Mar. 6,2010, at A12.
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would reinstate about 600 of them.227
them. 22 7 SIGTARP examined
examined the process
used to terminate auto dealerships and was sharply
sharply critical of the
government's role in these decisions, particularly
government's
particularly its failure to take greater
greater
22 8
dealerships.228
account of job losses at the terminated dealerships.
While the rationale
rationale for the bailouts
bailouts was different in the case of the
automakers
automakers than it was for the financial services
services firms, otherwise
otherwise the
Illinois/AIG/Citigroup principles were followed: removal
removal of the
Continental Illinois/AIG/Citigroup
board of directors,
directors, assertion of a
CEOs, changes in the composition of the board
"hands-off" policy. While there is less evidence
evidence of Treasury's exercising
"hands-off'
behind-the-scenes
automakers, Congress
behind-the-scenes control in the case of the automakers,
Congress in fact
companies' business strategy
strategy through
through its
directly interfered
interfered with the companies'
2 29
intervention in the dealership closings.
closings.229
intervention
E. Ally
(f/k/a GMAC)
GMA C)
Ally (flkla

Ally
Ally was established in 1919 as a GM subsidiary to provide automotive
230
Over time it expanded
expanded into other areas, including real estate
financing.230
3
finance, and in 2006 GM sold the company to Cerberus.2231
' The company
was hard hit by the collapse of both the housing and the automobile
2008, the Federal Reserve
Reserve approved its application
markets. In December 2008,
application
232 and the government provided infusions
create a bank,
bank,232
capital into
to create
infusions of capital
2 33
billion.233
the company, for a total of $16.3
$16.3 billion.
As a result of the third
investment in December
December 2009, the government's equity interest was
investment

!d.
id.
228
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
228 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GEN.
PROGRAM, supra
(stating that "perhaps
PROGRAM,
supra note 219, at summary of report (stating
"perhaps it is
inevitable that public ownership
ownership of private
private companies
companies will have the effect of
of
blurring
strongly
blurring the Government's
Government's appropriate role"). Treasury
Treasury stated that it strongly
disagreed with the report. Id.
Id. at app.D.
disagreed
229
Congressional meddling:
229 As additional
additional evidence of Congressional
meddling: a spokesperson for Rep.
Darrell Issa objected to GM's gift of a free sports car to a Detroit
Detroit Tigers baseball
Darrell
player who was robbed of a perfect game by an umpire's bad call, stating that
"[u]ntil
"[u]ntil G.M. has repaid
repaid the taxpayers
taxpayers in full for the money
money they have borrowed,
every action that G.M. takes should advance them in that direction."
every
direction." Nick Bunkley,
As aa Gift Stuns aa Few,
Luxury Car
CarAs
Few, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at Bl.
Bl.
230
GMC Gets
Gets New Name: Ally
Ally Financial,
230GMAC
Financial,1853 CHAIRMAN
CHAIRMAN (May 7,2010),
7, 2010),
http://www.1853chairman.com/2010/05/09/gmac-gets-new-name-ally-fmancial/.
http://www.1853chairman.coml20
10/05/09/gmac-gets-new-name-ally-fmanciaV.
231
231 Press Release, Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, GM Reaches
Reaches Agreement to Sell
Controlling Stake in GMAC (Apr. 3, 2006), available
available at
http://www.cerberuscapital.comlnews
-pressJelease
_ 040306.html.
http://www.cerberuscapital.com/newspress
release_040306.html.
232 GMAC, LLC, Current Report
232 GMAC, LLC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 24, 2008).
233
Hibah Yousuf, GMAC Receives 3rd
3rdRound
Round ofBailout
Funds, CNNMONEY,
CNNMONEY, Dec.
233 Hibah Yousuf, GMAC Receives
a/Bailout Funds,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/30/news/companies/gmac-bailout/
30, 2009, http://money.cnn.coml2009/12/30/news/companies/gmac
_bailout!
index.htm.
227
227
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234 and
increased to
to fifty-six percent
percent (from
(from the previous
previous thirty-five
thirty-five percent),
percent),234
increased
and
Treasury has the
the right
right to appoint four (up from
from previous
previous two) of
of nine
Treasury
35
governance agreement
agreement provides
provides that in connection
connection with
with
directors.2235
The governance
agreement and work
work
any IPO
IPO the
the parties will "revisit
"revisit the terms of the agreement
make such
such modifications
modifi·cations as may
may be reasonably
reasonably
together in good faith to make
such public offering...
offering ....
."236,,236
necessary to facilitate such

While the board removed
removed its CEO Alvaro
Alvaro de
de Molina in November
November 2009
2009
While
of the
the company's
company's failure
failure to raise additional
additional funds required
required by the
because of
because
administration stated that it played
played no part
part in
government stress tests, the
the administration
government
237
decision.237
that decision.
appointed only three
thr~e directors of the four
government has appointed
To date the government
directors it is entitled
entitled to name. Again
Again they fit the pattern: two are men,
men, and
and
currently a CEO, one is an investment
the median age is sixty-one. One is currently
banker, and one is a principal in a private
private equity firm.238
firm.238
government's involvement
involvement in Ally;
We do not know much about the government's
directors it is authorized
authorized to
Treasury's failure to appoint the full number
number of directors
Treasury's
involvement is minimal. The Congressional
Congressional
name suggests that its involvement
Oversight Panel was critical of the government's
Oversight
government's bailout of the company,
2 39
fail.,,239
It
since
Ally
did
not
present
systemic
risk
and it was
was not "too big to fail."
It
present
since Ally
Treasury had yet to require
require a business'
plan from its
business -plan
also noted that Treasury
40
Perhaps the message from Ally
Ally is that the administration
administration
management.2240
become too comfortable
comfortable with qailouts
bailouts and too willing to expend
has become
government
government funds on private business.

IV. A MODEST
MODEST P'ROPOSAL
PROPOSAL .
Despite assertions from Congressional
Congressional members that the era of federal
bailouts is over, the reality is that there will be future financial crises and
bailouts
businesses whose failure presents systemic risk
bail out businesses
government will bailout
the government
to the financial markets. Many of the government's actions since fall 2008
234 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note
234
SIGTARP , QUARTERLY REpORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 20 I 0, supra
62, at 46.
235 See Michael
de la
Eric Dash,
Giant G
GMAC
235 See Michael J.
J. de
la Merced
Merced &
& Eric
Dash, Lending Giant
MA C Asks for More
More
U.S.
U.S. Dep't of
of
also Press Release, U.S.
US. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, at BI; see also
the Treasury, Treasury Names Appointee to Ally
Ally Board of Directors (May 26,
20
I 0) (listing the two newest appointees,
government
appointees, totaling the number of government
2010)
four),.available
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
appointments to four),.
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
available at
tg720.htm.
tf20.htm.
6
GMAC, LLC, Current
Current Report
Report (Form
(Form 8-K)
8-K) (May
(May 21,2009).
21, 2009).
2 6 GMAC, LLC,
237 Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, GMAC
Ousted by Board,
237 Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, GMAC Chief Ousted
Board,WALL ST. 1.,
J.,
Nov.
Nov. 17,2009,
17, 2009, at AI.
Al.
238 Ally Financial, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 3, 2010).
238
Ally Financial, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 3,2010).
239
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
OVERSIGHT PANEL,
PANEL, MARCH
MARCH OVERSIGHT REpORT:
REPORT: THE UNIQUE
239 CONGRESSIONAL
TREATMENTOFGMAC
10, 2010).
TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER TARP, 121 (Mar. 10,2010).
24°Id.
240 Id. at
at 46.
46.
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extremely pressured
pressured situations. As the
have been ad hoc decisions made in extremely
bailouts wind-down, policymakers
policymakers should focus on the normative
questions: when is it appropriate
appropriate for the government to intervene, what
questions:
intervention take, and (the specific issue that is the focus of
form should the intervention
of
shareholder
this paper) how should the government act when it becomes a shareholder
in private business.
Continental Illinois through Ally, the
As I have shown in Part III, from Continental
principles about how it will act as a
government developed a set of principles
shareholder: removal of the CEO, substantial changes on the board of
of
directors, and expression
hands-off policy as shareholder with behindexpression of a hands-off
the-scenes
government has
the-scenes influence in other capacities.
capacities. In essence, the government
adopted the prevailing
prevailing model of corporate
corporate governance,
governance, with its emphasis
emphasis on
independent directors
directors and strong internal controls. Moreover, the directors
government's tenure generally
generally fit the
that have been elected since the government's
profile for independent
independent directors of public corporations:
profile
corporations: they are
predominately white males who are retired CEOs or senior management,
management,
presumably
experience and
presumably chosen because of their general business experience
gravitas. Consistent with this model, the role of the government
government as
shareholder has been passive; the AIG Trustees have resisted efforts to
become
government consistently
become activist shareholders,
shareholders, and the government
consistently states that it
. is a "reluctant shareholder."
shareholder."

Of course there has been government
government involvement, and indeed the
government would be acting recklessly if it did not act to protect
protect the
billions of dollars of government funds at risk.
Accordingly, the
government
intervened behind the scenes
scenes principally
principally in its roles as
government has intervened
creditor, regulator and politician. The government
government has intervened
intervened in a less
systematic and more confrontational
confrontational manner that has led to
misunderstandings,
TARP Special
Special Master making
making
misunderstandings, as for example:
example: the TARP
decisions on executive
executive compensation
compensation that made no business sense to the
AIG Chairman;241
Chairman; 241 Citigroup being confused about what the various federal
24 2
regulators expected
expected from it;
it;242
and Congress
Congress placing restrictions on the
243
automakers to cancel
cancel dealerships and downsize.243
ability of the automakers
Moreover, members
members of the public understandably
understandably want greater
themselves how these uneasy alliances
transparency in order to assess for themselves
transparency
between government
government and business are working out.
Accordingly,
between
Treasury's reluctance
reluctance to disclose
disclose the identities of the AIG counterparties
counterparties in
the company's SEC filings, whatever
whatever the motivation, unfortunately fueled
2
public distrust. 244
44 A review of the AIG and Citigroup SEC filings reveals
government
very
very little concrete
concrete information about the nature and extent
extent of government
See supra
172 and
accompanying text.
See
supra note
note 172
and accompanying
See
Press
Release,
The White
White House,
Office of
Press Sec'y, supra
supranote 194.
See Press Release, The
House, Office
of the
the Press
194.
See supra
223-28 and
accompanying text.
See
supra notes
notes 223-28
and accompanying
See supra notes 174-75
174-75 and
accompanying text.
244 See supra notes
and accompanying
241
242
242
243
243
244
241

HeinOnline -- 5 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 593 2010

594
594

BUSINESS LA
LA WJOURNAL
W JOURNAL
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS

Vol. 5:2
5:2

involvement. The 2010
2010 AIG proxy
proxy statement
statement does
does little
little more than
than identify
involvement.
as aa risk factor the government's
government's stock
stock ownership
ownership and warn
warn that
that the
the
as
245
24 5
other
shareholders.
be
shaieholders.
government's
interest
may
from
be
different
government's interest
Similarly, the Citigroup
Citigroup proxy statement
statement and Annual
Annual Report
Report do not provide
provide
effect of
of government
government involvement,
involvement, except
except with respect
respect
information on the effect
information
executive compensation
decisions. Citigroup
Citigroup only identifies aa risk factor
compensation decisions.
to executive
government shares may have
have on the stock price. 2246
4
the effect the sale of the government
may seem
seem silly to get upset
upset that GM
GM gave
gave a car
car to a Detroit
Detroit
While it may
24 7 the adverse public reaction to this gift may reflect a
baseball player,
player,247
adverse public
baseball
of information.
information.
'
frustration about lack
lack of
frustration
Perhaps it is time to consider
consider another
another approach.
approach. My modest
modest proposal
Perhaps
corporate
accepts
that
the
director
primacy
model
is
the
prevalent
prevalent corporate
primacy
accepts
governance theory. Working with that model, I make
make three suggestions:
suggestions: (1)
governance
Treasury is a substantial
substantial shareholder, it should work with corporate
When Treasury
management regularly to provide the general
general public with clear
clear specific
management
statements
government intervention
intervention and its effect on the corporation.
corporation.
statements about government
itit
corporation,
public
(2) When Treasury
Treasury is a substantial
substantial shareholder
a
public
corporation,
in
shareholder
should use its power to nominate
nominate and run its own nominees
nominees for the board
board of
of
directors,
representatives of Treasury
in
Treasury in
directors, who would serve on the board as representatives
order to represent
represent the interests
interests of the U.S.
U.S. taxpayer. (3)
(3)" When Treasury,
TreasUry, as
power to
to
a shareholder
shareholder in either a public or private corporation,
corporation, has the 'power
elect or appoint directors, it should select at least some high-level Treasury
Treasury
officials to those directorships. Unlike directors who come from the
business sector, they will be able to present
present the government's perspectives
perspectives'
business
and concerns
other members of the board.
'
management and the other
concerns to management

As to the first proposal: the classic corporate governance model
provides shareholders
information apart from SEC filings and
and
shareholders with little information
24 8
what management
management may voluntarily
voluntarily disclose.
disclose?48
Limited access to
information is consistent with the passive role of shareholders. In a
information
corporation in which the government
government has taken a substantial equity interest,
corporation
however, members of the general public have reason for concern, for this is
taxpayers have a sizable stake.
U.S. taxpayers
an extraordinary situation in which all U.S.
It is also understandable that, given the unusual situation, the public would
be confused or mistrustful of government
government intervention. Under these
circumstances, the government should work with management
management to provide
circumstances,
maximum transparency,
transparency, consistent with protecting
protecting the corporation's
corporation's
legitimate needs for confidentiality.
The principal objection to this proposal is that it would put undue
burdens on management
government at a time when decisions and
management and government
See AIG:
AIG: Where
Where is
is the
the Taxpayer's
Taxpayer's Money Going?,
Going?, supra
supranote 135.
135.
See
supranote
note 7,
7, at
at 56;
56; Citigroup,
Citigroup, Inc., supra
supra note 189, at 48.
246 CITIGROUP, supra
247 See GMAC Gets New Name: Ally Financial,supra note
247 See GMAC Gets
New Name: Ally Financial, supra
230.
248 See BAJNBRIDGE,
BAINBRIDGE, supra
supranote 50.
248 See
245

245

246 CITIGROUP,
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judgments affecting
affecting the company's
company's continued
continued viability
viability would
would likely have to
judgments
made in
in a compressed
compressed time
time frame. A
A related concern
concern is the increased
increased
be made
securities fraud liability
liability for intentional
intentional false disclosures
disclosures
risks of federal securities
material information.
information. These objections
objections are consistently
consistently made
made
relating to material
In order to establish
establish
whenever expanded
expanded disclosure
disclosure duties are advocated. In
whenever
liability for securities
securities fraud disclosure
disclosure violations,
violations, however,
however, plaintiffs must
must
liability
establish scienter, which
which requires proof of
of intentional
intentional misconduct
misconduct or
or
establish
reckless conduct,
conduct, and federal
federal courts maintain
maintain high standards
standards for plaintiffs
plaintiffs to
reckless
meet the burdens of pleading
pleading and proof. ItIt is unlikely that this
this provision
meet
that it
would
increase
directors'
potential
liability.
Another
objection
Another objection is that
would increase directors' potential
would put the corporation
competitive disadvantage
disadvantage vis-a-vis
vis-a-vis
corporation at a competitive
would
companies that did not need
need bailing out. While
While this may
may be true, it is a cost
companies
of the bailout and should not override the public's need to know.
As to the second and
and third proposals:
proposals: the participation
participation in the corporate
directors who are identified
identified as government
representatives
boardroom of directors
government representatives
boardroom
could do much to alleviate
alleviate the tensions between the business and the
government. The government
government directors
directors would
would be members
members of the body
interests of the
charged with the responsibility of acting in the best interests
shareholders
and
would
participate
in
the
important
decisions. As
business
important
would
shareholders
members of the board of directors,
directors, the government
government representatives
representatives would
would
explain the government's
concerns and to listen to
position to explain
government's concerns
be in the best position
the management's
management's concerns. A greater
greater understanding
understanding on the part of all
directors could promote a more informed
informed balancing
competing interests.
balancing of competing
In addition, because
because the directors
directors would be better informed about the
government's
business, they would be better able to monitor the government's
investment. In this way, perhaps business
business and government
government objectives could
advanced in a more sustained, policy-oriented, less confrontational
confrontational
both be advanced
manner.
government
A principal objection to my proposal is that the government
A
representatives, as members of the board of directors, would owe fiduciary
representatives,
corporation that could conflict with their obligations
obligations to the
duties to the corporation
U.S.
earlier, 24499 boards have broad
U.S. government. However, as discussed earlier/
discretion to take into account social and policy considerations
considerations in exercising
discretion
their business judgment; operating a business in a manner reasonably
reasonably
designed to payoff
pay off government debt would surely pass muster. Moreover,
so long as directors act in good faith and without gross negligence, their
judgment rule. Finally, the
actions will be protected by the business judgment
government, as a controlling shareholder, may already owe a fiduciary duty
25o
shareholders in at least some circumstances.250
to the minority shareholders
disfavor
corporate model views with disfavor
Another objection is that the U.S.
U.S. corporate
"special
''special interest" directors because the board of directors is supposed to act
249

249

See supra
supra notes
notes 35-38
35-38 and
and accompanying text.
See
52 and accompanying text.

250 See
See supra
supranote
note
250
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as a collective
collective decision-maker
decision-maker and
and arrive at
at business
business decisions that reflect
reflect
as
an ideal,
ideal, however, that may
may not conform
conform with
with actual
the consensus.
consensus. That is an
the
Use of a controlling
controlling shareholder's
shareholder's voting
voting power
power to place
place its
practice. Use
representatives on a board, moreover, is accepted
accepted practice,
practice, and some boards
representatives
include directors that represent a constituency,
constituency, as when preferred
preferred shares
shares
do include
because of unpaid
unpaid dividends or the certificate
certificate of
of
get voting rights because
incorporation allows for cumulative
cumulative voting.
incorporation
this is yet another
another step closer
closer to
Finally, another objection is that this
"nationalizing private business"
"nationalizing
business" or even "socialism."
"socialism." Because
Because of the U.S.
U.S.
be
a
conversation
aversion
to
these
concepts,
this
objection
may
conversation
well
objection may
concepts,
aversion
government can
which case we will muddle
muddle along, hope that the government
stopper, in which
extricate itself from these companies
companies and pray that this will never
never happen
happen
extricate
again. That would be unfortunate.
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